INDIA.

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CONTENTS:

	PAGE.
INDIANA: Paragraphs on Indian Topics, by "Fidus"	129
Chitral: An Object Lesson	133
Rural India	134
Military Aggression and the Budget	135
OUR LONDON LETTER	136
THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY IN INDIA, by Professor A. F. Murison, LL.D.	139
SOME ASPECTS OF INDIAN FINANCE, by T. Lloyd	140
SIR C. DILKE ON INDIAN FINANCE	142
BIBLIOGRAPHY of Books and Articles on Indian Subjects	144
THE FORWARD FRONTIER POLICY:	
I.—Chitral Relieved: What Next? By Sir W. Wedderburn, Bt., M.P.	145
II.—Lord Roberts and Indian Frontier Defence, by J. Dacosta	147
III.—The Anglo-Russian Agreement and Chitral, by an Ex-Diplomatist	149
IV.—The Dark Shadow Behind Chitral, by an Anglo-Indian	150
V.—An Appeal to Lancashire	152
OPINIONS OF SOME EXPERTS:	
(i) General Sir N. Chamberlain	154
(ii) General Lord Chelmsford	155
(iii) General Sir C. J. S. Gough	155
(iv) General Sir J. Adye	156
(v) "An Expert"	156
(vi) Major H. G. Raverty	158
SOME OPINIONS OF THE PRESS	158

Indiana.

A large part of the present issue of INDIA is devoted to the discussion of the ruinous "forward" policy which the recent war in Chitral has exemplified in so striking a fashion. I should like to direct special attention to the signed articles and the citations of opinion which are to be found in the later pages of this Review, and to the questions and answers contained in the Parliamentary report.

Mr. J. Dacosta, whose reply to Lord Roberts is printed on another page, writes:—A leading article in the *Times* of April 23rd contains the following sentences:—

> "If by going to Chitral we are to earn the undying hostility of every neighbouring tribe, then no doubt the cost and difficulties are alike formidable. But if, on the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that what has again and again happened elsewhere will happen here, and that these independent tribes may be organised and converted into wardens of the marches, the substantial objections to Lord Roberts's views fall to the ground."

The writer in the *Times* omits to say where such results have happened. The Afridis of the Khaiber and the Mahsud Waziris of the Gomal consented, it is true, to keep their passes open to trade and ordinary traffic under stipulated conditions; and a number of their *maliks* assured us, in consideration of liberal subsidies, of the feeling of admiration and attachment which they and their tribesmen entertained for the British Government. A more convincing proof of their fidelity to an infidel Power which is attempting to subjugate their co-religionists will, however, be needed to warrant the belief that those border tribes may be converted into wardens of the marches or, as Mr. Curzon said, "into an irregular frontier guard of the Indian Empire." The treatment we received at the hands of the Mahsud Waziris when we recently attempted to occupy their territory in the prosecution of our "forward policy," exposed clearly enough the folly of our relying upon money-bought professions and assurances, and there is absolutely no room to doubt that the Afridis are quite as ready as the Mahsud Waziris have shown themselves to resent the presence of British garrisons in their country.

A Bombay correspondent writes, under date March 30th:—To-day's local papers publish the lengthy explanation offered at the Viceregal Council on the 28th inst. by Lord Elgin touching the Chitral imbroglio. He goes into a long history of the acquisition of Chitral. The upshot of it all is that Chitral, under an old agreement with the Mahárájá of Kashmir in 1876, was taken as a vassalage of Kashmir, that the British gave a small subsidy in consideration of which the chieftain agreed to be an ally of the Indian Government, and that therefore the British are bound to protect Chitral from harm at the hands of the enemies of the Mehtar. This is the first time that such a statement has been made. When Gilghit was acquired, when Hunza and Nagar were forcibly seized, and when public criticism was strong against such acquisition, not a word was said

of this so-called compact of 1876. My own belief is that this is simply a strained story of some haphazard arrangements arrived at with Kashmir by Lord Lytton's Government in anticipation, at the time, of the invasion of Afghanistan. This is now paraded as a permanent arrangement.

The fact is that the Foreign Office has the thread of the whole history of these border tribes and Khanates in its own hands. Viceroys may come and go. They know absolutely nothing of that history. Whenever important occasions arise, the Foreign Office prepares a *précis* of past relations and circumstances. It is prepared to show, (i) generally, that the Government of India has some imagined or distant claim, and (ii) that the British Indian Government is the aggrieved party—the injured martyr. The public are misled by these representations. Who can verify the so-called facts related by the Foreign Office? Do we ever hear the case of the other side? In the absence of the story of the tribes themselves, how can we place implicit reliance upon the version of the Government of India?

In the case of Chitral (my correspondent adds) we may depend upon it that the Viceroy has been tutored by the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office is the showman who pulls the strings of the puppet. The public should exercise its critical faculty and judge how far each statement of the *précis* is borne out by the facts. Who is going to do that? We never know the true history. When the Amír three years ago wrote out a manifesto and commented on certain facts prejudicial to him as they were represented in the official organs, the public became aware of the difference between the two versions. But the chiefs of all border tribes are not like the Amír. Otherwise we might know a great deal. When scepticism is shown, the India Office or the Foreign Office puts up some traveller or other who has travelled in the Khanates to corroborate the special narrative. For instance, there is Mr. Curzon, or Captain Younghusband. These travellers are simply *protegés* or friends of the Foreign Office. It is a wonder that our old friend Professor Arminius Vambéry is holding silence. Sir H. Rawlinson is dead, and the India Office may not have another redoubtable Russophobist ready for the occasion. The *Pioneer*, strange to say, is dead against the invasion of Chitral. Perhaps there is a split between it and the Foreign Office.

As will be seen from the reply given on April 4th to Mr. Samuel Smith's question in the House of Commons, Mr. Fowler has at length determined that a Royal Commission and not a Select Committee shall enquire into the expenditure of the Indian revenues. The terms of reference are not yet stated, but it is earnestly to be hoped that Mr. Fowler will perceive the wisdom of allowing due scope to the enquiries of the Commission. A mere investigation of the way in which the Finance Department does its work would not be very profitable to anybody.

At the time of writing, the Report of the Royal Commission on Opium has not yet been published, and discussion of the subject is therefore postponed to our next issue. Meantime, it is generally believed that the attention of Parliament will shortly be called to the attitude adopted towards the Commission by the authorities in India.

The articles which Mr. Alfred Webb, M.P., contributed to the *Manchester Guardian* of April 3rd and 8th are an interesting addition to his recent speeches upon Indian affairs. He marvels "why everyone that can at all afford it and who can spare the time does not travel" to India. But English visitors to India should avoid some of the habits of Anglo-Indians:

> "I endorse the commentary made by a fellow-countryman upon Anglo-Indian habits: 'They eats and they drinks, and they drinks and they eats, and they dies, and then they writes home and says the climate killed them.'"

Mr. Webb does not appear to have been greatly attracted by Indian scenery, but he describes the archæological remains as surpassingly interesting:

> "Years would scarcely suffice for even their cursory examination. One can have no conception of what Indian civilisation has been, of what the Indian people are capable, until one has seen something of them. The Taj Mahal at Agra surpassed all my expectations. It is surpassingly beautiful. It has not the soul or the associations of the Parthenon, or the Colosseum, or our cathedrals, but it is surpassingly beautiful—as the face of a person we did not know might strike us as the most lovely face we had ever seen. It is perfect in itself and in its surroundings. I saw it thrice—by moonlight, in broad sunlight, through a thunderstorm—and I did not know in which aspect most to admire it. The inlaid marble palaces, the tombs, the pearl mosques, exceed anything of which we can form any conception."

As for vague charges against Hindu rites, Mr. Webb holds the prudent opinion that they should be eschewed.

> "However defective the Hindu and Muhammadan schemes of life may appear to us, they are the best known to millions, their spiritual support and mainstay. So far as I could judge, there is perhaps less individual breaking away from those schemes which appear best to them than there is with us; and in practice they allow worldly prosperity and personal convenience to interfere less with adherence to what they believe to be divine truth than we do. What disturbs us most—what appears to us most repugnant to high civilisation and enlightened advancement—is the position of women. Changes in these respects can come only through the people themselves, and especially through their women, who are the most conservative supporters of present customs. The caste systems bar all effectual progress. Surely it cannot be long before

those who now cling to them come to perceive their incompatibility with national strength and advancement."

Happily the perception of this fact has already, as the success of the social reform movement shows, begun to dawn upon India.

Mr. Webb writes, as he has always spoken, in the highest terms of the character of the Indian people. "If," he says, "patience and kindliness of disposition, if contentment under hard conditions of life, if happiness derived from little things are Christian virtues, they possess them in no small measure." Apparently trivial but really significant incidents bear witness to Indian honesty:

"In one of the larger Indian cities I conversed with the agent of a sewing machine company who had had large European experience. His principal business was selling machines on monthly instalments. I asked him what he had found was the average percentage of bad debts in such business in the United Kingdom. He said about 10 per cent. And in India? About 1 per cent., and such bad debts were almost entirely amongst Europeans and Eurasians. 'Practically we have no bad debts amongst the natives. If it comes that they cannot pay instalments, they will give back the machines.'

"When leaving Bombay I had occasion to buy a bag to hold odd parcels. At a Hindu shop I was shown one for 2½ rupees. I tried further for something better, returned (the proprietor, not the attendant, was then in) and said I would take the bag. 'I cannot let you have it,' said the man, 'there is a hole at the back!' And so there was—one about the size of half-a-crown, that I scarcely would have noticed.

"In bazaars so crowded that it was with difficulty I made my way amongst the people were money-changers, with piles of coin laid out on open boards before them. Could money be so exposed with us?"

Readers of India are familiar with Mr. Webb's opinions as to the need of a courteous and friendly demeanour on the part of Anglo-Indian officials, and his personal testimony as to the poverty and the misery of the mass of the Indian people. It is to be hoped that many Lancashire readers digested his timely exposition of the duty of the United Kingdom to India:

"In return for peace, good order, honest administration, and a scheme of government generally beneficial, India has to suffer an immense annual drain of resources—military charges, retiring allowances, pensions—spent outside her shores. What we have to look to is that the salaries of Europeans in the Indian Civil Service are not unduly high; that Europeans do not occupy posts that might be held by natives; that the taxation, especially the military expenditure, is not excessive; that there is a fair allocation of charges as between India and the United Kingdom. These are the questions towards which the educated opinion of India is being more and more directed. On most of them, we must remember, the interest of the military and Anglo-Indian official classes is opposed to that of the natives of India. They cannot be unbiassed judges."

As to the need of popular representation for India Mr. Webb speaks with no uncertain sound:—

"Mr. Fowler is without doubt able and conscientious. But few previous Indian Ministers ever appeared more inclined, whether he is himself aware of it or not, to be guided by officialdom. 'We are all members for India!' he exclaims. The Indian Budget is of as much importance to the people of India as our Budget is to us. If 'we are all members for India,' how come it that we do not show the same keen interest in it as we do in ours? The optimism that would salve our consciences regarding our duty to India by the platitude that 'we are all members for India' is the same optimism that opposed Parliamentary reform and that pretended to believe that a Parliament without Irish tenant farmers and Labour representatives was competent to do justice to Irish farmers and to the interests of the labouring classes."

Not less true are Mr. Webb's warnings that with a military class war is generally approved, that Englishmen should beware how they leave decisions regarding Indian frontier-wars mainly with military councils, and that taxation amounting (as in India) to 5 per cent. upon average incomes of less than 30s. is a heavier burden than taxation amounting (as in the United Kingdom) to 7½ per cent. upon average incomes of more than £30. Mr. Webb's concluding words deserve to be remembered:—

"What is necessary before everything else, and what is immediately practicable, is that the natives of India should have more and more place in the councils in India and at home regarding the affairs of India. In proportion as, for the unity of the Empire, it may be considered necessary that the one people should hold the unquestioned superiority in arms, so the other should be allowed full voice in council. Liberalism at home is paying heavily for illiberalism in India. It is difficult to estimate the extent to which reactionary principles are here supported and advanced by returned Indian officials. We are certainly bound to give careful consideration to the most popular exponent of Indian feeling as yet in existence—the Indian National Congress that meets yearly. If more Europeans attended they would better understand the reasonableness and importance of its proceedings. They would give more weight to its resolutions. Until these proceedings have wider space in our newspapers we shall have little right to consider ourselves 'members for India.' The Congress was the most impressive and interesting gathering in which I ever took part. No one could be present during the four days' proceedings, no one could listen to the speeches and realise how English history is being studied and English politics followed in India, without coming to the conclusion that Indian questions are for us serious questions—that India, if left only to the officials, might yet be a tenfold embarrassing Ireland."

Some of the journals which profess to represent the "Imperial," which is also the "cultured" and the "gentlemanly," party gave their readers a taste of their quality the other day. In the House of Commons, on April 9th, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, M.P., the only Indian member of the House, and a leader of the large and increasing Indian Parliamentary party, joined, and joined rightly, in the farewell expressions of thanks and esteem to the retiring Speaker. Mr. Naoroji's remarks, which, as the *Times*' report showed, were greeted with cheers, were in unexceptionable taste and of exemplary brevity:

"In the peculiar position in which I am placed here I offer to you, Mr. Speaker, my most sincere and heartfelt gratitude for all the kindness and helpful counsel you have always extended to me."

Whereupon the *Standard* and the *St. James's Gazette* permitted themselves to refer to Mr. Naoroji in terms which I can only describe as worthy of the baser sort of Anglo-Indian journal.

The *St. James's*, which is conspicuous for its habitual arrogance towards the people of India and

their representatives, wrote, in a leading article, of "the impudent self-assertion of the Parsee gentleman who, by a strange freak of electoral fate, represents a Metropolitan constituency," while on another page it printed this precious paragraph:

"When all the recognised parties in the House had expressed yesterday through their respective leaders their appreciation of Mr. Peel's services, members were startled to see Mr. Naoroji suddenly rise to his feet. What special claim the member for Central Finsbury had to speak on such an occasion it is hard to discover. Mr. Naoroji himself based his claim on his 'peculiar position,' whatever that may mean. The most notable peculiarities of his position are the extreme narrowness of the majority by which he holds his seat, and the fact that he claims in some mysterious way to represent the 'people of India,' though he has spent a large part of his life in England and belongs by birth to the small Parsi community localised in the Bombay Presidency, which is about as closely connected with the majority of the people of India as it is with the people of Venezuela."

In the same handsome temper the *Standard* wrote:

"The rising of Mr. Naoroji on the vote of thanks to the Speaker created a good deal of surprise, and would probably have excited some resentment, had it not been that any manifestation of feeling would have disturbed the impressive character of the scene. Mr. Naoroji represents nobody but himself, and has not a single follower in the House. There was a general feeling yesterday that the speeches were unnecessarily numerous, and that on these ceremonial occasions it would be better to revert to the earlier practice of allowing the leaders of the two great parties to speak the sentiments of the whole House."

It would be as idle to reply to the irresponsible insolence of these paragraphs as it would be to observe that Mr. Naoroji, whose position in the House of Commons is not determined by the amount of his majority, did not invent the present mode of procedure on the occasion of a Speaker's retirement. But the paragraphs are worth noting as a sample of the temper in which some English journals apparently think it becoming and patriotic to refer to the one Indian member of Parliament. If English newspapers indulge in such licence in London, what can we expect from Anglo-Indian officials in India? *Quid domini faciant, audent cum talia fures?* It is not thus that Englishmen win the confidence and affection of their Indian fellow-subjects.

Mr. A. O. Hume contributed to a recent number of India an article upon the attempt of the Madras Government to annex the Laccadive Islands belonging to Sultan Ali Rájá of Cannanore. The latter has, I learn, addressed to the Viceroy a memorial appealing against the arbitrary proceedings of the Madras Government in depriving him of his hereditary title of "Sultan." It is suggested that the purpose of this deprivation is to reduce him to the position of an ordinary landlord as a preliminary to depriving him of his Sovereign rights. It is high time that the whole matter was brought to the notice of the House of Commons.

By the sudden death of General Sir George Chesney the Conservative party in the House of Commons has lost a valuable and highly respected member, and the Indian National Congress an opponent so reckless that he was more helpful than some supporters. His life, which lasted sixty-five years, was one of remarkable success. A youth of eighteen he joined the Bengal Engineers; ten years later he received the brevet rank of major and the medal and clasp; ten years later, again, his book on "Indian Polity" made his reputation as a military reformer. He afterwards became Military Secretary to the Government of India, and later, as a member of the Governor-General's Council, shared in the responsibility for the disastrous policy of aggression beyond the North-West frontier. It was said of the late Mr. Froude that there was too much romance in his history and too much history in his romance. Sir George Chesney's "The Battle of Dorking," which made his name with the British public, was a story with a purpose and, remarkably enough, its author lived to see his purpose—the strengthening of our home defences—accomplished. Shortly before his death he re-wrote "Indian Polity," in which the account of the reform movement in India is too little removed from the imagination of the novelist. In Parliament, where he attempted on behalf of Indian officialism to reply to Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, Sir George Chesney was not a conspicuous success. As the *Times* justly says, "he did not show himself to be an eloquent or a brilliant speaker, though he was a good talker and possessed a keen sense of humour." The Duke of Argyll, who has thought it necessary to call attention to his own share in originating the Royal Indian Engineering College at Cooper's Hill, describes Sir G. Chesney as "very able, highly cultivated and accomplished, a thorough gentleman, and with a personal manner of great modesty, gentleness and charm." It is a pity that, in dealing with the non-official aspect of Indian affairs, Sir G. Chesney's prejudices habitually got the better of his sympathy, but those to whom he was most keenly opposed agreed in recognising his unfailing frankness and his disposition to be fair to the best of his knowledge. His attack upon Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji secured for the member for India a national ovation of unprecedented enthusiasm; and his attack upon the Indian National Congress provoked a brilliant and memorable rejoinder from the late Chief Justice of Bengal.

Sir George Chesney died suddenly on March 31st, and surprise has been expressed that, in these circumstances, the April number of this Review contained so severe a reply to his attack upon the Indian National Congress. The sentiments of our critics do more credit, if one may employ a cant distinction, to their hearts than to their heads. If

they knew anything at all about the subject on which they express an opinion—the method, that is to say, of producing a periodical publication—they would know that articles contained in a Review dated April are written and printed before March 31st. As a matter of fact, the April number of INDIA had been published and circulated to subscribers some days before Sir G. Chesney's lamented death.

The Hon. Mahárájá Pratáp Náráyan Singh Bahádur of Ayodhya has just enriched the literature of his country by the publication of a handsome and scholarly work ("Rasakusumákar." "Indian Press," Allahabad), on the Art of Rhetoric as illustrated by Hindu poets. The literature of this language, the most widely diffused of all the vernaculars of India, is rich in poetic treasures, from which a copious selection, numbering upwards of five hundred excerpts, has been made in order to afford examples of the language, the rhythm, and the figures employed to call forth the various emotions which constitute the *rasa*, or "flavours," of literary composition. Indians are as precise in the analysis of the passions, and in the classification of their subtle distinctions, as they are in their analysis of the various operations of the mind. They name nine primary sentiments as the emotions which impart "relish" to literature. Every composition falls under one or other of the following designations: Erotic, comic, pathetic, wrathful, heroic, terrible, repulsive, marvellous, or quietistic. Thirty-four accessory or transitory emotions arise from these primary sentiments, including the feelings of apprehension, envy, weariness, despondency, resolution, arrogance, shame, joy, and so forth. These emotions are supposed in their turn to give rise to effects which contribute to arouse the desired emotion in the heart. There are two "excitants" to these emotions, which are termed "enhancers" and "fundamentals." The "excitants" include the whole *dramatis personæ* and machinery of the poem, the "enhancers" being the friend, the servant, the jester, the parasite, or the messenger, as well as the seasons, the wind, the forest, the garden, or the moonlight. The "fundamental excitants" are the heroine and the hero themselves.

The theory, with its amusing mathematical precision, is thus seen to be fairly simple. It is only in working out the system and in pursuing the minute subdivisions of the subject that the intricacy becomes apparent. In the present volume the Mahárájá has made an effort to place the whole subject on a scientific basis. He gives us a careful grouping of the several parts, and supplies tabulated schemes and other accessories to a clear apprehension of the whole. A great array of books on the same topic has been put together during past centuries, but no preceding author has condescended to simplify the subject, or to bring its manifold peculiarities into view as parts of a harmonious whole. Hitherto the subject has been expounded in verse, which left the definitions in their primitive obscurity. The Mahárájá for the first time gives each definition in prose. He has also supplied a glossary of obscure and archaic terms in the verses, an index to the verses themselves, and indexes to the subjects of which the book treats, arranged both textually and alphabetically. A special feature of the book is the set of forty plates with which the text is enriched. They illustrate the various emotions and their "excitants." They have been well executed, and the whole volume is sumptuous to look upon. FIDUS.

CHITRAL: AN OBJECT-LESSON.

WE have no apology to make for the manifest predominance of one subject in our present issue. The invasion of Chitral and the attention that the progress of the campaign has attracted in the United Kingdom offer an opportunity of unsurpassable importance to those who desire to see the insensate policy of military aggression beyond the frontiers of India discredited and abandoned at once and for all. There is no need to recapitulate here the incidents of the recent campaign or the considerations upon which the statesmanlike policy of Lord Lawrence, too lightly reversed by Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton, was based. The former are fresh in the reader's mind, and the latter are set forth elsewhere by experts of the highest authority. But we may well remind British electors that when, either by express approval or, as commonly happens, by mere indifference, they sanction the so-called "forward "frontier policy," they incur a terrible responsibility. "What you want," as Mr. John Bright said, "is a "new and a wiser and a broader policy, and that "policy, I much fear, you will never have from the "Government of Calcutta until the people of Eng-"land say that it is their policy and must be "adopted." Now, if ever—while the mingled recollections of the Chitral campaign and the imposition of the cotton duties are still fixed and fresh—is the moment to bring home to the electorate the folly of the endlessly extravagant military policy which lies at the root of the financial embarrassments of the Government of India. We are extremely glad to learn that the National Reform Union has appreciated the significance of the occasion, and that, at its meeting in Manchester on May 1, Sir W. Wedderburn, M.P., Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, M.P., and Mr.

W. S. Caine, M.P., will expound to a representative audience of Lancashire men the true causes of India's chronic difficulties. It is earnestly to be hoped that not Lancashire electors only but the electorate of the United Kingdom will learn the lesson and, before it is too late, insist through their Parliamentary representatives upon a saner policy for the common benefit alike of ourselves and of our Indian fellow-subjects.

RURAL INDIA.[1]

The kind of information about the way in which the people of India, or some of them, live and move and have their being, which Mr. Carstairs furnishes in this useful volume, is of the utmost service to people in England who wish to get at some tangible knowledge of our great Eastern dependency. Mr. Carstairs has had some twenty years of official experience; he has mixed freely, so far as an official can mix freely, with the people; and he writes in a tone that persuades us that he has no object to serve but the truth. The personal element remains to be weighed and eliminated, and the remainder ought then to be very valuable. He states his position as follows:

"Before we have lived long in the country, and while our imagination has not been dulled by too much contact with actual facts, we are perhaps better qualified than afterwards to form broad views and express them with confidence. A certain bold disregard of details is almost necessary if a strong effect is wanted. I feel that a twenty years' training of close attention to detail has to a great extent deprived me of any power in that way. I shall attempt rather to describe the effect on my own mind of this long personal contact with India and its people, than to impress lessons or information on the minds of others. . . . . I come forward as a witness, not as a judge, claiming nothing more than a belief in my sincerity. . . . . I do not profess a complete knowledge of the subject, but admit that my knowledge is limited and partial. My career has been in Lower Bengal, one out of the many provinces of India, and even within that province the greater portion is personally unknown to me. It is of the people I have seen and lived among that I would be understood to speak. . . . . Their customs forbid social intercourse, and their literature is, with a few exceptions, not informing on the point [of their character]. Such information as I have had has been gained chiefly from litigation and from talks. I have had before me during my twenty years of Indian life scores of thousands of law cases civil and criminal, and these have given me many a peep into the social and family life of the country, otherwise veiled from me. . . . . Then I have spent, besides the longer time when I lived at my headquarters, some 1,500 days in touring about among the villages, during which time I have traversed some 15,000 miles, going with my tents from village to village, mostly over ground unknown to the tourist, unheard of by Europeans in the greater Indian towns. On these rounds I have seen and conversed with men of all degrees, rich and poor, great and small, learned and ignorant, and of all religions, castes, and occupations. . . . . I have had reason to believe that, different as is my race and remote my home, I possessed the confidence, and, I fain would think, also the affection of many among them. I dare not say I know them, but I can honestly say that all this time I have tried hard to understand them."

Now this passage certainly discloses a most important range of experience, an ingrained caution and sense of proportion, and an invincible modesty. Each of these factors contributes very largely to the value of Mr. Carstairs's statements. Mr. Carstairs also frankly acknowledges his home longings in his lonely isolation, his strong and ineradicable feelings of race pride, and his sense of the prestige of England. He concludes that we cannot grow like the Indians, and that the Indians cannot, except on the surface, become assimilated to us. "There are Bengalis," he says, "—all honour to "them—who are in advance of their fellows, but so "few are our opportunities of testing them to the full "that even these I cannot trust deeply. Courteous "and friendly when all is well; not very satisfactory "to do business with at any time; in time of trouble "and adversity, broken reeds. That is what they "seem to me." He fears a break on an occasion of real strain. Whether or not his Scotch temperament carries his caution to an extreme limit, it is an opinion that deserves respect as being reasoned, honest, and judicially expressed. For our own part, we think his constitutional and patriotic standard, together with the circumstances in which his experience was gathered, has impressed an excessive severity upon his judgment.

Mr. Carstairs gives special pains to the description of the Indian Hodge. "How does neighbour Hodge "live? What does he think of? What are his "hopes, fears, ambitions? How (most important of "all) does he quarrel, and what about?" The main varieties—there are many varieties, even within Mr. Carstairs's knowledge—are the fighting man, the drudge, and the pioneer. "The fighting men "are to be found chiefly on the banks of the great "rivers—the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the "Megna—where, after each year's floods, thousands "of acres of fertile land are found to have been "formed or swept away, according to the caprice of "the stream." The fighting Hodge is on the watch to rush in and occupy the new land, holding it against all comers by the strong arm. These conditions point to a wide expanse of instability and to large possibilities of misery. The fighting quality, however, which is good enough for such occasions, is inadequate for the native army, which finds its recruits outside Bengal. The drudges are hereditary labourers on the vast expanses of plain that have been for generations under close cultivation. They form the great mass of the agriculturists, Hindu and Mussulman, and, by their natural increase, constitute the "congested districts." The pioneers are found where jungle is yet to clear and waste land to reclaim, contending not with other men, but with wild beasts and nature—"on the borders "of Eastern Bengal, in the Terai, in the Delta of the "Ganges, and in the less dense but less fertile forests "of South-Western Bengal."

"Hodge has a very narrow horizon, generally bounded by the village and the market town. He thinks, not of the wide world, but of his own little world—the village. . . . . His interest in outside matters is almost nothing; and why? Because his mind is held firm by village interests. His dreams are within the village, and seldom wander elsewhere; and his rage, when kindled, burns, not against the distant stranger, but against his kinsmen and neighbours."

Mr. Carstairs illustrates the life of Hodge in large detail—his daily labours, his domestic anxieties, his social troubles, his relations to the landlord, the

[1] "Human Nature in Rural India." By R. Carstairs, B.C.S. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons.

money-lender, and the village ruffian, and his position before the representatives of law and order. It is a lamentably confined, troubled, and unhopeful picture. What an amount of suggestion there is in the following anecdote:

"Hodge is, we will say, one of the peasant proprietors of the village. He cultivates a few acres of land, out of which he has to make enough to live on, and to meet his expenses. He is too proud, as a rule, to work for hire. . . . I remember once, when there was a flood in the river, which was eight feet above the level of the country, only kept back from devastating it by a rotten embankment. The embankment was all but topped, and was showing signs of a flaw, and we were at our wits' end for labour to stop the breach. Just below the place where the breach threatened was a village, which must certainly be swept away first if the embankment broke, lives being endangered and property destroyed. But not a soul in the village would stir. They said this was coolies' work, and the business of the Government, and they would do no work except on their own fields. They felt about it just as a London clerk would feel if called on to work as a blacksmith."

There are some painful statements, too, about sanitary carelessness and ignorance. "Hodge's water supply is often very bad. What he has he makes bad use of, for he will bathe his cattle, bathe himself, and wash his dirty clothes in the reservoir itself, and then drink the nastiness afterwards." "If impurities get into the water, that is the affair of the water." "Water is the great purifier, and Hodge believes that it purifies everything, and is of so great virtue that it cannot itself be defiled."

Turning to the industrial classes, Mr. Carstairs finds the chief characteristic to be that indigenous industry "is all hands and no head—all labour and no capital—all instinct and little thought—power of imitation but little originality; and more patience than energy." The capitalist trader exploits the skilled artisan, generally holding him in his debt and doling out to him enough to keep him alive. The two classes who work the springs of all industry in India are the money-lender and the landlord. Mr. Carstairs, while admitting the very objectionable characteristics of the money-lender, fairly states the case from "Hunks's" point of view. "Hunks cannot help himself. Needs must when the devil drives. And this will continue to go on until money-lending transactions are conducted out of savings instead of from the living fund." The landlord is similarly driven in his endeavours to make ends meet, what with inherited debt, litigation, charges, and family complications.

There seems to us to be a considerable strain of caricature in Mr. Carstairs's "dream of Home Rule" in his chapter on "The Bengal Republic," which ends with the moral not to deliver the tasks of might to weakness. At the same time it may be admitted that the people of the land possess less motive power than the British, without admitting that the native power is inadequate, under more just conditions of estimate, for its own tasks. The chapter on "Quarrels" is amusing and suggestive; and, if the illustrative example of how the law is made to serve local purposes be not overdrawn, it shows very strongly how much has yet to be done towards an effective legal administration. The final chapter, "A Peep into the Sonthal Country," contains a suggestion that deserves notice. The question in the village is, not "master or no master," but "who is master?" The thing is to get the right village headman. "The chief significance of the Sonthal system is that it is the result of education, not of a subject people by a government, but of a government by a subject people." Mr. Carstairs speaks energetically against the official tendency to break down the system and bring the Sonthals within the pale of "civilisation." "I hope," he says, "that time will never come. Rather do I look forward to the time when this excellent system shall be extended to the whole province. Why not? It is not peculiar to the Sonthals, but was once common —as may it become again!—to all races in the country. This is my earnest hope, because I know no other method of laying a firm foundation for a strong and free fabric of local self-government."

MILITARY AGGRESSION AND THE BUDGET.

[FROM A BOMBAY CORRESPONDENT.]

A Bombay correspondent, writing at the end of March, says:—The past week has been eventful in two respects—for the Budget and for the reverse to some of the party of Dr. Robertson in the Chitral territory. As to the latter, it is not surprising. The Government of India rushes into these border expeditions with a foolhardiness and enthusiasm which are simply astonishing. The question of upholding British prestige will now be flourished in the face of the world. The expedition will be pushed forward at all hazards and a crore, or possibly more, will be spent. And this, too, within a week of the Budget, which provides the ridiculous sum of 15 lakhs for a force of 14,000 men and followers, marching through an impassable country and fighting its way every inch. This is "preparedness" with a vengeance. Would that our rulers might perceive how unrighteous it is to persevere in this policy of external aggression. The wisdom of those dissenters—Sir A. Colvin and Mr. C. P. Ilbert—is being justified, and more than justified. Mr. Mehta attacked the aggressive policy at the recent meeting of the Legislative Council, on the Budget debate. He attacked the aggressive policy with great effect and severely criticised the Finance Minister. The latter endeavoured to defend himself, though not without a sneer at the Memorandum presented to the House of Commons last year upon Indian expenditure. He is reported to have observed that the Memorandum was replied to by Mr. Fowler. Of course, as everybody knows, Mr. Fowler steered clear of it by saying that he had no time to criticise the figures in detail. The Memorandum was corroborated by Sir Auckland Colvin. Is the Finance Minister going to contradict him? The Viceroy made a long speech explaining the reasons of the Chitral Expedition. We are all disappointed with Lord Elgin. He has proved to be too plastic a tool in the hands of his advisers. He lacks firmness.

The Budget is, of course, a specious document. It reveals the usual art of cooking but nothing

beyond it. Of what value is a statement of this kind which is falsified within a week? The Chitral expedition will certainly cost nearer 150 lakhs than the 15 provided in the estimates. Yet we are told of a surplus of 4 lakhs. But, to put aside the cost of the invasion of Chitral, what are we to say of the suspension of the Famine Fund? A special tax was raised to provide it. It was to be considered no ordinary expenditure. But how does our Imperial book-keeper treat the matter? He says that the fund can only be met out of a surplus. The genesis of that fund is well-known. The Famine Fund was to be considered as an annual recurring expenditure. It was never intended to be provided from a surplus because special provision was made whence to derive it. The special tax which was levied is still maintained. It is idle, therefore, to say at this time of day that the annual contribution to the Famine Fund can only be provided from a surplus. But in this way the Government relieves the debit side of the account of a crore and a-half. An honest Budget would have shown the amount. Virtually, then, by under estimating the cost of the Chitral expedition, and omitting or suspending the Famine Fund, the Finance Minister produces a spurious surplus. In reality there should have been a deficit of 3 crores after taking into consideration the new additional receipts from the import duties to that amount. Here we see the woeful condition of the Indian Exchequer. But there is something else which has to be taken into account. Does it not stand to reason that if one receives from somebody else a certain sum for a specific purpose, and if afterwards one spends only a portion of it for that purpose, and the balance for another purpose, he is committing a breach of faith? Even if one diverts it for a time, is it not fair that the money should be refunded? Let me apply this illustration to the process of the sterling remittances last year. They amounted, under different heads of sterling expenditure, to 17 millions. The taxpayers, under various heads, provided the receipts to meet the equivalent—namely, about 34 crores of rupees. What happened? Not 17, but only 15 millions were remitted. The remaining 2 millions, or 4 crores, were diverted to another purpose, and, in order to satisfy the demands of the Secretary of State, the Government of India borrowed 2 millions in England. It was, they said, a temporary loan. But even this year they have not been able to repay it. They are about to renew it. But under any circumstances they were bound to provide for the 4 crores from these receipts. They have done nothing of the kind. Had they done so, the deficit on this account alone would have been 4 crores. The Government has concealed this liability. Virtually the provision this year for the bills of the Secretary of State should have been:

	Millions.
1895-96	17
Diverted to other use in 1894-95 ..	2
Total	19

But the Government provides only for 17 millions. It is thus evident that if the Budget had been honestly prepared it would have shown a deficit of 7 crores:

	Crores.
Chitral (probable expenditure) ..	1½
Famine Fund, suspended	1½
Balance of last year's remittance diverted	4
Total	7

What an appalling deficit, and that, too, after three crores of new taxation: (i) an item of military expenditure (Chitral) is under estimated; (ii) an item of annually recurring expenditure (ordinary) is suspended; (iii) thirdly an item to meet a liability is spent elsewhere, and a loan borrowed. Another item ought to have appeared in a balance sheet purporting to represent a full and fair statement of receipts and expenditure. Had the two millions not been borrowed, the case would have been different. In reality the Government raised the loan by a side wind, so to say, and under-estimated last year's deficit to that extent. If they cannot repay it, it will mean so much more added to the permanent debt.

These are the three big blots which I find in the Budget. I refrain from discussing other points, exchange, for example, and military expenditure.

OUR LONDON LETTER.

A meeting will be held in the Concert Hall, Peter Street, Manchester, on Wednesday, May 1st, at 8 p.m., when addresses will be delivered on the subject of "The Civil and Military Expenditure in India," by Sir William Wedderburn, Bart., M.P., Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, M.P., and Mr. W. S. Caine, M.P. The chair will be taken by the Hon. Philip Stanhope, M.P., President of the National Reform Union. The importance of this subject to Lancashire, emphasised as it has been by the recent imposition of import duties on cotton, has led the Committee of the National Reform Union to arrange for this meeting.

"We can only partially console ourselves (wrote the *St. James's Gazette* of April 25) by reflecting on the excellence of the Indian Army, as shown, for instance, in the present dashing little Chitral campaign. True, we have a fine army in India; but it is not due to the English War Office, nor is it paid for, as most Englishmen no doubt imagine, out of the Army Estimates voted by the House of Commons. India pays for its own armed forces, out of its own revenues." That is a fact which is too often forgotten in the United Kingdom.

The following important motion, in the name of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, M.P., still appears in the order-book of the House of Commons: That, in the opinion of this House, in order to preserve and maintain the stability of the British power, the loyalty, confidence, contentment, and gratitude of the people of British India, to improve their material and moral condition, and to increase largely com-

mercial and industrial benefits to the people of the United Kingdom, it is expedient that the solemn pledges of the Act of 1833, of the Proclamation of 1858 after the Mutiny, of the Proclamation of 1877 on the assumption of the Imperial title at the great Delhi Durbar, and of the further confirmation of these Proclamations on the Jubilee of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen and Empress of India, should be fulfilled by, among other reforms, giving effect to the Resolution adopted by this House on 3rd June, 1893, viz.: That all open competitive examinations heretofore held in England alone for appointments to the Civil Services of India shall henceforth be held simultaneously both in India and England, such examinations in both countries being identical in their nature, and all who compete being finally classified in one list according to merit.

Mr. Naoroji has also given notice that he will call attention to the refusal by the Secretary of State for India to grant certain returns.

On the subject of remuneration of Europeans Mr. Naoroji has given notice of the following motion:—That, in the opinion of this House, it is just and expedient that the financial relations between the United Kingdom and British India should be so adjusted, with regard to all the expenditure incurred in the employment of Europeans in the British-Indian services, civil and military, in this country and in India, that some fair and adequate portion of such expenditure should be borne by the British Exchequer in proportion to the pecuniary and political benefits accruing to the United Kingdom from Her Gracious Majesty's sway over India; and that the British Treasury should sustain a fair and equitable portion of all expenditure incurred on all military and political operations beyond the boundaries of India in which both Indian and British interests are jointly concerned.

A large gathering assembled at 14, Beaufort Gardens, on Saturday, April 6th, in response to Lady Wedderburn's invitation, to meet some Indian ladies and enjoy the music which one of them supplied. Members of Parliament, including Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji and Mr. Alfred Webb were present, besides a large number of Indian gentlemen in native or European costume. Among them were the husbands of some of the Indian ladies. Naturally (the *Queen* says) interest centred in the latter, whose pleasant manners, readiness to talk and to be amused, suggested to the mind that, if ever life in the zenanas had been dull and bored, the experience had been quite left behind.

The ladies were dressed in a modified English costume, but retained Indian jewellery and the beautiful drapery known as the sari. Sowbhagyavati Shevantibai Nikambé, in excellent English, and without a shade of nervousness, addressed the gathering on the subject of her school at Gilgaum, Bombay, for fifty Indian girls, mostly married.

The other Indian ladies present were Mrs. Boyce whose husband is reading law at Lincoln's Inn, and who has assumed an English name; Mrs. Gupta, a Bengali; and Mrs. Thomas, widow of a Eurasian, the sister of Cornelia Sorabji, whose musical talent has already been mentioned. All the ladies seemed to have an excellent command of the language, expressing themselves with great readiness. Should the fashion spread of Indian ladies accompanying their husbands to England and making acquaintance with English social life, one cannot help wondering what will be the effect upon Indian life. In all probability (the *Queen* thinks) it will, for good or evil, hasten the breaking up of caste.

"There is," said Mr. Villiers, the "Father of the House of Commons," to an interviewer the other day, "much in our government of India that it is difficult to defend, and, in my opinion, the extravagances of our administration ought to be checked—I mean our military expenditure as much as anything. We must keep our promises to the natives. The cotton duties will not be tolerated for long, and as soon as deficiencies in revenue have been made up they must go. They are a kind of Protection, and I do not like them. As to the movements of native opinion, it is difficult to estimate them, but I think Mr. Fowler is not disregarding them."

A Bombay correspondent writes that Lord Sandhurst "is winning golden opinions on all sides."

The Duke of Argyll, in the course of a letter on the origin of the Royal Indian Engineering College at Cooper's Hill, says that "the House of Commons as a whole has the best disposition towards our Indian empire, and very rarely interferes with its government. But when it does, the India Office is too often at the mercy of many personal or sectional interests at home. The majority of its members are ignorant and indifferent, and can with difficulty be brought up to support the Government on any contested point. . . . . Cabinets are always bored if Indian questions are brought before them. . . . . There is chronic war between the India Office and the Treasury on many questions of charge upon the two revenues."

These are the opinions of the Duke of Argyll. Fortunately, as a matter of fact, the House of Commons is showing its good disposition towards our Indian empire by interfering more and more in its government. The India Office is being taught its proper place in the general scheme of things, and ignorance and indifference are being displaced in Parliament by knowledge and interest. There was no Indian Parliamentary Committee when the Duke of Argyll was at the India Office.

The *St. James's Gazette* thinks that not enough credit has been given to Ulster for forming the splendid material which Sir George Chesney himself developed with assiduous industry. He owed much to the blood of his staunch old grandfather Alexander, or the "Old Captain," as they called him at Annalong—a stern unbending heart of steel, who had often rallied the Carolina Royalists to the support of Lord Rawdon's army in the War of Independence; who thrashed a sense of duty and right feeling conscientiously into his children—with admirable results,—and put his son a lieutenant nine years old on horseback at the head of a company of the royal volunteers in the '98. The "Old Captain" was what they call a "grand man" in

county Down, where he long commanded the coast-guard and fought sanguinary smugglers. His character came out strongly in his son Francis, the greatest of the family, who, when he was delayed by fever on the famous "Euphrates Expedition," refused to sleep to any other music than the rivetting of the boiler-plates, that told his delirious mind that the work was going on.

Sir George Chesney himself had much of this indomitable Ulster pluck. He was a man of great resolution and immense perseverance. Quite late in life he revived his Greek by reading his grammar every day in the train and systematically getting up his vocabulary between Wimbledon and Victoria. There was a deal of the old Ironside in his blood. One has but to read the early record of the family and the adventures of the "Old Captain" to realize that. Besides, Sir George's grandmother was a niece of Margaret Wilson. Whoso cannot construe this must go to his neglected Macaulay.

When George Chesney was born, his uncle, "Euphrates" Chesney, had not yet made acquaintance with the river which was for many years his chief thought: but he had demonstrated, for the first time, long before Lesseps, that the Suez Canal was a practical scheme for engineers, which nobody had believed since Napoleon's expedition. He sent his report, recommending the canal to Lord Palmerston, who let it lie; but the discoverer's thoughts were even then of the future of the distinguished Indian statesman whom we are now mourning. This diary—up the Nile—records that he was still thinking about his brother's orphan children: "May God enable me to do what is right by those he has left." ("Life of General F. R. Chesney," 197-199.) In after-years he did "what was right" to advance his nephews with all the zeal and loyalty of his stalwart Ulster soul.

Mr. D. E. Wacha has compiled, and the Commercial Press at Bombay has published, a handy little pamphlet containing extracts from Major Evans Bell's works on "the true Imperial policy with regard to the government of India." The pamphlet is issued under the title of the late Sir G. Chesney's well-known book—"Indian Polity"—from which, needless to say, it differs greatly.

An Indian paper states that "Mir Sultan, a grandson of the late King of Delhi, is now a head clerk in the office of the District Superintendent of Police, Yemethen." On this statement the *Reis and Rayyet* makes some notable comments. "The late King of Delhi," says our Calcutta contemporary, "was, of course, the unfortunate Bahadur Shah, who was deported to Burma after the suppression of the Mutiny. As to Mir Sultan, whose son is he? Was his father one of those unfortunate princes who were shot, after they had surrendered, by Hodson? Probably Mir is no legitimate descendant of Bahadur Shah. But legitimate or otherwise, this young man may have Bahadur Shahs', and therefore Akbar's, blood in his veins. Who is there that will not honour him for earning his bread by industry, instead of nursing any sentiment about his birth and taking advantage of the generosity of some Mussulman nobleman whose ancestors had served the House of Delhi?"

There is here a sense of the dignity of independence and of work such as would have delighted Carlyle. It is well that this descendant of kings should prefer to earn the bread of industry rather than to live as a dependant, and it is a good sign also that his decision should have the approbation of those for whom the *Reis and Rayyet* can speak. Apart from this aspect of the incident, it is certainly a curious instance of the "vicissitudes of families" that a representative of the race of the great Akbar should be seated upon a clerk's stool instead of an imperial throne, and should wield the pen of a ready writer instead of the sword of a conquering soldier.

That veteran writer on Indian affairs, Mr. John Dacosta, has collected and republished in a compact volume fifteen of his essays which have appeared at various times in the *Law Magazine and Review*. The essays contain authentic information which will undoubtedly prove useful when administrative reform is undertaken, and they are a highly valuable adjunct to Mr. Dacosta's well-known work, "A Scientific Frontier."

"The Indian Dyers' and Calico Printers' Diary and Year Book" (1895. Proprietor, Morargi V. Naik, Bombay; Printed at the Education Society's Press) is now first presented to the public, and appears to contain much useful matter in a convenient form. It gives a list of the principal firms employed in the industries named, though there are some omissions, as it was impossible to obtain particulars. The cotton spinning and weaving mills are enumerated, and those are noted at which dyeing and printing are likewise carried on. (We notice that there is a puzzling and apparently unnecessary change of signification in the sign used to denote the latter.) No particulars are given of the indigo factories as their number is so large, but it is remarked that many of them belong to native proprietors.

A large increase in the import of Aniline and Alizadine dyes, which is noted more than once, points to the increasing tendency of these dyes to displace the indigenous vegetable product. The change is in many cases advantageous, for these dyes are cheaper and the necessary processes more cleanly than is the case with the indigo dyes. The science of dyeing has made such rapid strides during the last few years, and is now engaging the attention of so many eminent European chemists, that it is probable that manufacture from the vegetable product will soon be entirely displaced by a synthetic method. Under these circumstances it is of the highest importance that Indian dye-houses should be under the management of competent men, well-trained in the scientific side of their art. The number of places where dyeing and printing is carried on has increased very much in the last ten years, and the advantage to manufacturers of cotton goods in dyeing and printing their own materials is obvious. There is an opening here for skilled workmanship, and it appears that pupils of the Kala-Bhavan at Baroda have already been employed in this way.

THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY IN INDIA.

By Professor A. F. Murison, LL.D.

In February last, Mr. Krishna Menon, Lecturer on Agriculture at the Sydapet College, Madras, who has been extending his knowledge and experience of his subject during a prolonged visit to this country, delivered a very able and most interesting address to the Indian Section of the Society of Arts on "Village Communities in Southern India." Mr. Menon's lecture will be found in full, with the discussion that followed it, in the *Journal of the Society of Arts* for February 22. The lecturer did ample justice to the services of Sir Henry Maine in drawing the attention Western students to the village communities of India. His criticisms of Maine are substantially just, and, if his immediate purpose had not restrained him, might have been carried a great deal further. Since Maine wrote, however, very much more has been done to throw light on the ancient institution than Mr. Menon acknowledged. At the same time there is vast scope for the labours of fresh inquirers. Mr. Menon was deeply indebted, at many points of his address, to the masterly paper by Mr. John Adam on "Chingleput and the Village Community," which was printed in Part 1. of the "Proceedings of the Maine Historical Society of Madras" (April to September, 1890). Now that Mr. Adam has returned to Madras, it is to be hoped that he will find time from his professional work to follow up his Chingleput investigation with many similar inquiries, and will also stir up other local students to emulation in the same field of research. The deep importance of such studies is universally recognised by those who understand their bearings. Mr. Menon, too, will be expected to give us further fruits of his studies in this department.

In the first part of his paper, which is really an historical exposition and argument, Mr. Menon sets himself to prove "that the people of Southern India had, from time immemorial, an inalienable right in the soil they tilled; that they maintained this right through all the changes that have taken place in the history of India till the advent of the British; and that the village communes they prized so much were shattered to pieces only after the tremendous blows they received from the early British administrators, ignorant of the past history and genius of the people which built up a system of institutions of surpassing vitality." Though Mr. Menon lays himself open to criticism at more points than one in his details, it must be conceded that he substantially proves his propositions. His description of the constitution of a village commune in the Madras Presidency consists with the descriptions of previous writers and exhibits a close analogy to similar institutions in other parts of India.

"The organisation of a village commune in the Madras Presidency is complete even to minuteness. Its constitution is democratic, self-sustained, self-sufficing. It has all the features of a highly organised society, like one of the cantons of the Swiss Republic. Its functionaries are various, and are answerable only to the village, there being no representative of the paramount power to be answerable [to]. The village [council] consists of an elective body called the *panchayat*, or the assembly of five elders. There was no hereditary chief or headman, but one of the five officiated as head at the deliberations of the council. Then there were a host of minor officials to carry out the executive work of the commune. These may be enumerated as follows: (1) *karnam*, accountant, whose business is to keep the village register, showing the area cultivated each year by each sharer, the extent of the land irrigated, and other matters pertaining to agriculture; (2) *nirgunti*, distributor of water for irrigation purposes; (3) *alayar*, village watcher, who is otherwise known as the village police; (4) *vettyan*, village scavenger, who has to look to burials, cremation, etc.; (5) schoolmaster; (6) doctor; (7) astrologer, or the village meteorologist, who is to give a forecast of the weather, the time for sowing, harvesting, etc.; (8) the priest; (9) the washerman, barber, potter, carpenter, smith, etc. All these officers and functionaries had a share in the produce of the soil. The constitution of the village Government was essentially a body democratic. According to Mr. Ellis, 'the duties are discharged by the village senate, *gramapravarticam*.' In this assembly every sharer has a seat and a voice."

There are also interesting passages in Mr. Menon's description of the methods followed by the Hindu village communes in the management of the arable land. One method is called *Samudayam*, by which the land was "cultivated by a joint stock of labour, cattle, and implements, the produce being shared by the members of the village community according to their respective shares." This is the more ancient system; the other system, known as *Kareiyedu*, represents a stage of development. By the latter system, "the lands were temporarily distributed by lot into separate shares, and were subject to periodical redistribution." "The *Kareiyedu*," says Mr. Menon, "exists even to this day in some remote parts of Tanjore and Chingleput. The most remarkable feature of the *Kareiyedu* system is the recognition of the absolute principle of collectivism in conformity with the idea of individualism. . . . As late as 4th July, 1864, the *Kareiyedu* was worked in its entirety in the Tanjore district." Mr. Menon quotes from Sir Henry Stokes a full and lucid account of its operation, which should be compared with Mr. Hodgson's description of the Pudu-vayal (Carnatic) system, in the "Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1830."

There is one incidental point on which Mr. Menon might have profitably stated his grounds in larger and more definite detail. This is the inter-relation of communes and their co-operation in common undertakings. "Sir Henry Maine," he says, "throws a doubt whether the various communes ever met through their representatives to discuss questions of common polity, such as the management of temple affairs, the construction of irrigation works, the distribution of water to various villages, etc.; in fact, whether the Hindus ever rose beyond the independence of a village commune." Mr. Menon contends strenuously "that the autonomous village communes combined for various purposes, worked in harmony through their representatives on questions of common interest, . . . in fact, from a small village union, or *panchayat*, the assembly of five, they rose to representative municipal organisations which successfully carried out and maintained great public works of irrigation and transit. Evidences," he affirms, "are not wanting to prove that these municipal organisations met in grand assembly round the king's throne, and they dic-

tated terms to the king; in fact, it could be shown that under purely Hindu institutions there was no absolute monarchy, that the people were, and are, fully able to manage their internal affairs." Elsewhere Mr. Menon speaks of it as "a well-known fact" that "although these villages were self-contained units in themselves, they were simply part of a whole machinery, a wheel within a wheel." His great example is found in the mighty works of irrigation, and he also cites the case of temples common to several villages, and specifically the practice in Malabar. He explains, indeed, "the three stages of Hindu self-government by three modern institutions." The *Panchayat* corresponds to the vestry; the *Samudayam* (or representative body for managing temple affairs), to the municipal board, or county council; and the *Cheri*, *Karei*, or *Sangam* (or body, presided over by the king, "for discussing questions of national importance, in which the interests of several towns or villages are concerned"), to the grand assembly. There is large probability on the face of all this, but the evidence might have been marshalled and sifted with more convincing definiteness. Perhaps Mr. Menon will address himself to this task, free from the limits of an hour's lecture.

The tremendous British blows that, in Mr. Menon's view, shattered the village communes were three: the revenue settlement, the irrigation policy, and the forest conservancy. Is it possible to go back to the old system? Mr. Menon answers unhesitatingly, No. "The conditions are so completely altered, and the system of administration so rigidly crystallised, that no statesman would dare to revolutionise the present system." Still, if the Government would only recognise the intelligence of the people, reforms might be effected on all three points. On the question of revenue settlement, Mr. Menon is silent. As Mr. A. Rogers points out, however, there is much to be said for a proper settlement, though the principles and methods of execution have now and again been wrongheaded and defective. As to irrigation, Mr. Menon would not take the major branch from Government control, but he would hand over to the people the minor branch. Mr. Rogers thinks matters had better be left as they are, with slight exceptions; while Sir Charles A. Turner concludes that "probably no better scheme could be devised than that which had been advocated by Mr. Menon." There are obvious difficulties either way, but to an outsider there appears to be a great deal of force in Mr. Menon's conditions that "the law should be more elastic"—in fact, more suitable to the circumstances of the people—and that "more chances should be given to the people." This contention of Mr. Menon's receives remarkable illustration and confirmation from Mr. Carstairs's sketch of Sonthal local self-government in his "Human Nature in Rural India" (noticed in another column). As to forest conservancy, so far as regards the minor forests and the pasture lands, the Government regulations are intended to be particularly favourable to the rural population, and it is practically only upon the administration of the minor forests that Mr. Menon challenges the Government for a purely popular management. A thorough execution of the Government's intentions, however, would really obviate his difficulty. The simple question is whether this can be attained in practice.

After all, the study of comparative custom appears to confirm the conclusion that the village community is a primitive institution. The races among whom it is found are the backward races; the races that are advanced in civilisation have relegated it to a subordinate position, or practically let it go into desuetude. Here and there, under special circumstances, it might work better than any other system; but even Mr. Menon shrinks from advocating its resuscitation except in minor local matters. On the other hand, the modern system of local self-government is gradually working out the same ends on representative principles; and the more this prevails in India, the less will be felt the desuetude of the village community.

A. F. Murison.

SOME ASPECTS OF INDIAN FINANCE.

By T. Lloyd.

The new cotton duties and the speculation in silver have saved the Indian Government from a deficit which at one time threatened to be large. In the Budget twelve months ago it was estimated that even with all the new import duties there would be a deficit of considerably more than a quarter of a crore, and as the year went on the value of the rupee steadily fell, and it looked as if the result would be worse even than the anticipations of the Budget. So serious, indeed, did matters appear in November that the Home Government had to consent to the imposition of the cotton duties. Then came the speculation in silver, based upon the hope of peace between China and Japan, further to relieve the Indian Government. The result is that, according to the revised estimates, the year which ended with March closed with a surplus of nearly a crore of rupees. The Budget twelve months ago estimated very closely the yield of the duties then imposed, with the exception of silver. It was then thought probable that the imports of silver would be very small. As a matter of fact, they proved to be very large; and the duty upon silver, which was estimated to give only a million of rupees, has yielded somewhat more than three and a-half times as much. The cotton duties, too, though in force so short a time, have been satisfactorily productive. The railway receipts have likewise been good, and opium, because of the very high prices that have ruled and the small expenditure on account of the bad crop, has given more than was anticipated. For the new year the expenditure will be larger than in the last by rather more than three crores. But there is expected to be a small surplus, partly because the cotton duties will be collected for the whole year, while the other import duties are expected to be more productive than in the year of imposition. Railways are also expected to yield a larger return. So is opium and so is the land tax. But whether the year will or will not end with a small surplus

depends mainly upon the value of the rupee. If it remains as high as it is at present, then the prospect is favourable. If, on the other hand, the exchange value of the rupee falls, the year will unquestionably end with a deficit unless new taxation of some kind can be found or some lucky windfall comes to the relief of the Government. It will be recollected that for the year ended with last month it was expected that the India Council would be able to sell its drafts in London at an average price of 1s. 2d. per rupee, whereas the real average price was only 1s. 1·09d. The real average of the past year is taken in the new Budget as the probable average for the current year, and all the estimates are based upon this assumption. But whether the Council will be able to sell at so good a price remains to be seen. It is clear that the attempt of the Indian Government to fix the value of the rupee has utterly failed, and that it is not, therefore, to any efforts of the Government that we have to look for the prevention of a further fall. What is most hopeful, so far as the exchange question is concerned, is the peace between China and Japan and the speculation in silver that has arisen in consequence. The price of silver has been raised from about 28d. to nearly 31d. per ounce, and if the speculation continues, and the price of silver is kept up in this way, it is possible that the India Council may be able to get even more than the Budget estimate for its drafts. But if the speculation in silver breaks down, then the difficulties of the Indian Government will return. It is curious that Sir James Westland, in his Budget statement, avoids almost altogether the question of exchange, which all previous Finance Ministers have discussed at such length. Either he recognises that his predecessors showed extreme ignorance of the question, and he is, therefore, in no hurry to commit himself; or he hesitates to acknowledge what, however, is the plain truth, that the closing of the Indian mints has utterly failed to steady the exchange, and therefore to fix the value of the rupee.

The utter defeat of China and the probability, therefore, of an early peace stimulated a rather wild speculation in silver some months ago which continues still, and possibly it may go on farther because China consents to pay a war indemnity of about 30 millions sterling to Japan, which is receivable in silver and in five yearly instalments. If the whole of this sum were to be paid in coin it would, of course, have a considerable influence upon the price of silver. China or its agents in London would have to buy six millions sterling worth of silver annually and hand the proceeds over to the Japanese Government. But it need hardly be said that that is not the way in which the indemnity will be paid. In the first place Japan has bought ships and munitions of war in Europe, and now that the war is over and the destruction it has caused has to be made good, she will, no doubt, buy other ships and still more munitions of war. As China will borrow in London and hand over the proceeds to the Japanese agents, those agents of course will be instructed to pay out of the indemnity the purchase money for all their military and naval preparations. Again, the Chinese agents will, of course, avail themselves of all the facilities afforded by trade to remit from this country to Japan without actually sending cash. In all reasonable probability, then, not much more than a third of the indemnity, if so much, will be paid in silver, and ten or twelve millions sterling worth of silver bought over a period of five years will not be likely to raise very much the price of silver. The mere indemnity does not therefore appear likely to help the India Council very much. Of course, if China is to be opened up at once, and the trade of the Empire is to expand rapidly, silver may be required in large amounts for trade purposes. If so, the price will then go up and the India Council will be helped. But it does not seem probable that there will be a very sudden and a very great expansion of trade immediately after the end of a disastrous war. What is much more serious for India is that the close of the war relieves both China and Japan from the necessity of concentrating their efforts upon hostilities. Japan is certain to apply herself to industrial enterprises so as to repair quickly the ravages of the war —always assuming, of course, that she is not confronted by a quarrel with any European power, or powers. The whole influence of Japan will be used to compel China to fulfil her engagements as to opening up her territory to trade. If, then, there are to be four or five new Treaty Ports, if a vast addition is made to the part of the country where foreigners may trade, it is quite likely that China may be about to enter upon an era of very considerable commercial development. But China and Japan, being silver-using countries, will compete with India at a great advantage. The rupee is kept, by the closing of the mints, artificially high, while the yen and the tael are regulated in value by the value of silver. The result is that China and Japan will be able to sell everything in which they compete with India cheaper than India can. China, for example, will be able to undersell India in the tea market, and if the cultivation of tea should be thrown open to Europeans as one consequence of the war, the Indian tea industry may have to go through a period of very sore trial. Should this turn out to be the case, how will the India Council be able to sell its drafts? At present it is able to sell because the exports from India exceed immensely the value of the imports. On the supposition that Chinese and Japanese competition with India increases, that our imports from China and Japan augment while our imports from India fall off, there will be a much smaller excess of Indian exports over imports and consequently there will be a much smaller demand for Council drafts. It is obvious that should this happen the Council can stimulate a demand for its drafts only by reducing the price, and, therefore, it is quite possible that the value of the rupee may be forced lower than it actually would be if the mints were open. It would be rash to say that this will happen, but it is one of the contingencies to which the attention of the Government of India should be directed in time. This year as last year the India Office has to pay in London seventeen millions sterling, and that vast sum can be raised only by selling Council drafts. If the exports from India are checked by increased competition it is perfectly clear that the Council can

sell its drafts only by lowering and still further lowering the price.

The only real remedy consists in the reduction of the Home Charges. It is satisfactory to find that the Government of India is desirous of buying at home as much stores as it conveniently can and is encouraging the subordinate Governments to do the same. But it would be well for the Government of India to consider whether it could not buy all its stores at home rather than in England. We ourselves are convinced that it could, and that it would be wise to do so. Further, the Government ought to consider whether it could not make arrangements with regard, for example, to the payments which it has to make on naval and military account to the home Government. Surely it is not necessary to sell Council drafts for the sake of arranging these payments, at all events not for the settlement of the whole of them. There are clearly other ways in which the matter could be done—not as an exchange operation at all. The Government of India and the home authorities are constantly bewailing the difficulties caused by this question of exchange, and yet they obstinately refuse even to listen to any suggestion for reducing the Home Charges. It is absolutely beyond dispute that the Home Charges could be reduced, and very materially. In other directions there is room for considerable savings both in India and in England; and still more, there is great need for developing the resources of India. The Famine Fund, it is contended, has to be suspended, because there is no revenue available for keeping it up. But surely it would be possible to urge forward railway construction without coming upon the Government for the capital. The conversion of the rupee debt, Sir James Westland tells us, has saved 42 lakhs a year. It is a considerable saving, no doubt, and it would be a matter for much congratulation if economy on the same scale had been carried out in other directions. But we doubt very much whether the conversion of the rupee debt was altogether wise. For our part, we should far prefer a reduction in the sterling debt, and it seems to us that everything ought to be done to avoid adding to the sterling debt. Railway construction is necessary, for trade cannot expand without greater railway facilities. But railway construction would be effected at a great cost if it were only done by the raising of the capital in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, if the capital were raised in India in silver the benefit would be double; the country would be opened up and, at the same time, a new field of investment would be offered to thrifty Indians, while the Home Charges would not be increased. As we have pointed out above, India is handicapped by the closing of the mints in her competition with China and Japan, and she will undoubtedly feel that disadvantage severely if China is now opened up, and Chinese industry is really developed. India, therefore, needs every possible aid. She has an immense advantage inasmuch as she has the command of British capital and British skill, and also as she has so much railway communication which China has not. In China, it is to be hoped, railways will now be built rapidly. But India has a great start which she ought to keep by further construction of railways. There is plenty of capital in the country, and we do not doubt that there is plenty of enterprise likewise if only the Government will get rid of the notion that it is to be always and everywhere the Providence of India, and will allow private enterprise a fair and a free field.

T. Lloyd.

SIR C. DILKE ON INDIAN FINANCE.

A Correspondent of India sends the following account of an interview with Sir C. Dilke, M.P.

"Sir Charles, I once read (not for interviewing purposes) 'Problems of Greater Britain,' in which you say that most of India's difficulties are financial. Do you think so still?"

"But everyone thinks so," was the energetic answer. "Finance is at the bottom of everything, even the worst side of Indian government, the police. Finance is the difficulty in the way of military expeditions, frontier fortifications, and all the rest. The highest authorities think these increasingly necessary; the financiers tell us it cannot be done, and the result is a perpetual conflict."

"Surely you would not yourself advocate an increase in Indian taxation. At present, that would mean an increased deficit."

"Taxation ought rather to be reduced than increased. There are certain readjustments, certain economies that might be carried out to India's advantage."

"I remember that in 'Problems of Greater Britain' you advocate the disbanding of the Presidency armies in Bengal and Madras."

"Well, these changes are begun. The separate Presidency commands were given up last year; the army corps system has been substituted—a reform which I may say I had asked for years, and which five successive Viceroys recommended."

"Will that effect a great saving?"

"It tends rather to bar increased expenditure by increasing efficiency. A saving might be made by abolishing the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras, and their Councils, altogether, and substituting ordinary Lieutenant-Governors."

"But a Lieutenant-Governor has a Council too?"

"Yes, but not such an expensive article as those of the Presidencies. We can get efficiency at a cheaper rate, and we ought. And another benefit would accrue: the patronage of the Civil Service would be increased. We should get rid of appointments kept for home patronage."

"Yes, but none of these seems to be a very large economy, Sir Charles."

"Added together, they would mount up; they are well worth attention as India's finances now stand. Then I consider our ecclesiastical expenditure indefensible; it costs a good deal."

"Would you deprive Thomas Atkins of the spiritual help and advice of the chaplain?"

"No, I would not. But army chaplains come under the head of military expenditure; I refer to

the ordinary system which costs a good deal of money. Then another economy easy to effect is the abolition of the Council of the Secretary of State for India. I think it does more harm than good."

"I should have thought that as the Secretary of State for India is a man who does not always pretend to any special knowledge of India until he takes office, the existence of a Council might be justified."

"I don't see it," was the emphatic answer. "True, most of the men who compose it have held high office in India; but then a man's knowledge quickly becomes out of date."

"Euphemism for a fossil—" But Sir Charles continued:

"Very often the Viceroy in Council is virtually overruled by the Council of the Secretary of State in London. One of the numerous things its members opposed was the abolition of the Presidency commands. But the biggest economy of all would be a change in the whole system of enlistment for the white army in India. I recommended this change in a little book I wrote with Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in 1892, 'Imperial Defence.' All the Indian authorities think that India might get greater efficiency for the same money, or the same efficiency for less money."

"What ails our system of enlistment?"

"It is not based solely on India's needs, but is a compromise between her needs and ours at home. We generally enlist men for seven years, or for eight if they serve in India and their service ends while they are there. We call it short service, though all other nations would call it very long. It suits neither us nor India. It suits us better than it suits India, but for infantry a three years' service would suit us better still. For example, in the case of the Guards, most of the men have three years' service, with older non-commissioned officers."

"You don't surely mean that India would prefer a shorter length of service, seeing that she has to pay the cost of transport, pay during transport, and all the rest?"

"I certainly don't mean that. India requires the eight year service *without deduction*, and she is a pretty long way from getting it."

"How so?"

"In England most men recruit below twenty (and have to stay in this country until they are over that age) often under special enlistment; 'special' because those taken fall short of the conditions in age, height, chest width and depth. Really they are growing lads. India does not thus get full value for her money, not the full eight years, as she ought to do. That period covers the maximum of efficiency."

"Serving less than eight years then adds to the cost of the army?"

"Yes. Left to herself, India could run her military system more cheaply than it is run for her. She has complaints about the supply of stores, guns, etc.; she pays the transport of men out and home, pays them on the way, pays a sum supposed to represent the cost of the training of recruits, pays full rates for pensions—a very costly army."

"Considering that food, and drink too, is cheap out there, might not one say the army is highly paid in India?"

"If our home system of enlistment were separate from that of India, and free exchange could be made, we should soon find out the rate of wages necessary to be paid for Indian service. The marines are a long-service force, and serve mostly abroad, yet there is no difficulty in getting recruits. I should be disposed to let men leave when they liked; very few would do so under right conditions. Most of them like service in India."

"Perhaps because they are not harassed with too much work."

"Certainly they have to work harder at home. In India, a good deal of work is done for them. A little more might prevent them from thinking of the heat so much. It is awful in the plains from May onwards. I've tried it. But it is not as a rule unhealthy for men who have plenty to occupy them."

"In 'Problems of Greater Britain' you discuss various sources of revenue which might be tried in India."

"Yes, and I quoted some which Sir J. Strachey advocates. He thinks half a million might be raised from licenses, and about the same from stamps. I look upon a tobacco *régie* as quite feasible; I don't think the difficulties of introduction are too great."

"India is so very poor. If there is any benefit to be derived from tobacco, it seems hard to debar poor people from it."

"But a *régie* might be worked so as not to be a tax on the poor. The poorer sorts of tobacco in France escape taxation, comparatively speaking. Europeans in India have now taken to smoking their own Indian cigars. Except for wealthy natives, the whole importation of Manilla tobacco has ceased."

"How much would a tobacco tax yield?"

"Impossible to say until the tax is tried, and a system decided upon. I believe Sir J. Strachey puts the tobacco *régie* at three or four millions. The Turks, for instance, have established agencies to push the sale of their tobaccoes abroad. I think that with more Government care in supervision, Indian cigars might get a great position. Indian tea might be pushed too. Outside England, it is scarcely known, and even we know much more about Ceylon."

"Perhaps the peculiarities of Indian orange pekoe might prove a drawback?"

"I don't think so. Remember Indian teas are very various, and a change in such matters is a good thing. There is a great tea market in the Dominion of Canada. Australia is a good market per head, but the population is small. The Americans drink fine teas with their lunch."

"Of course, India could only make money out of tea as an export?"

"That is my meaning. To return to Indian revenue, I am of opinion the great landowners get off too cheaply, and some of the native States pay us too little. The native States get great advantages over our parts of the country. We give them a lot of things which they do not have to pay for. They make up for this partly by deficiency caused by mis-

government—of course, I do not speak of all: some, Mysore for example, are excellent—partly by keeping up what *they* call Imperial service troops."

"Evidently, you don't."

"No; for this reason. I think they are not of much value to us. We have to employ troops in brigades of a certain proportion of whites and of natives. If you increase these Imperial service troops without increasing your white troops, you gain nothing. Some of the Imperial service troops are good, but they take the place of our native army if they can be used at all. They are officered partly by natives, but have a force of white officers. These Imperial service forces vary greatly, as do those generally of the Native Princes, from the Haidarabad contingent downwards."

"And I suppose the proportion of whites to natives is as the laws of the Medes and Persians, which alter not?"

Sir Charles raised his eyebrows. "There is a danger with mercenary troops. We and they have no common ties: our best troops are mercenaries. Take the Ghoorkas, for instance, who are recruited in Nepal, a State tributary to China. Why should the Ghoorkas remain loyal to us if things went wrong? Perhaps they are the first troops in the world, *as long as things go right*. But the Ghoorka is a foreigner, even to the people of British India."

"Then, on the whole, you think there is no objection to opening up fresh fields of taxation?"

"I prefer to advocate the measures of economy I have touched upon. They are necessary and would be more popular; especially is a different system of enlistment necessary."

"What is the average military expenditure in India?"

"It depends upon the rate of the rupee and upon the military expeditions which crop up. For a good few years the average has been about 17 millions sterling, including strategic roads, etc. This year there has been an increase on account of Chitral, but, of course, we cannot yet calculate how much. Strategic railways have also to be taken into account, for many railways made for strategic purposes are counted only as public works."

"And then India pays a large contribution to the maintenance of the navy."

"Oh no, a very small contribution; practically she gets it for nothing. There is not a case for a very large contribution to the navy, as India has not much sea-borne trade of her own. It is nearly all carried in British ships. Canada pays nothing, and yet she has a very large mercantile marine."

"I gather, Sir Charles, that you are not hostile to the Indian National Congress movement?"

"Far from it: it is the inevitable result of the seed we ourselves have sown. It is true the Congress is not thoroughly representative, but it is as representative as present circumstances will allow. The fact of its not being thoroughly representative ought not to blind us to the reasonableness, the wisdom of many of the Congress demands. British rule can only be strengthened by widening its base."

And I took my leave much impressed with the fact that Sir Charles had all his subject and everything pertaining to it right in the front of his mind, although he is so deep in amendments to the Factory Bill now before the House of Commons, that he might well have been pardoned had India and the Colonies been relegated, for the time, to a subordinate position.

There can (said the writer of "Indian Affairs" in the *Times* of April 8th) be no question either in India or in England as to the immediate duty of relieving Dr. Robertson. But there seem to be very serious questions in regard to the policy which has allowed a British frontier officer to place himself in a position which, in the opinion of experienced Indian critics, he should never have occupied and from which it will cost the Indian taxpayer some two millions sterling to extricate him. Even a loyal supporter of the Government like the *Pioneer* feels compelled, in a closely-reasoned article, to protest against what "seems to be in truth a melancholy confession of political incompetency."

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INDIA.

LONDON, MAY, 1895.

THE "FORWARD" FRONTIER POLICY.

I.—CHITRAL RELIEVED: WHAT NEXT?

BY SIR W. WEDDERBURN, BART., M.P.

As Dr. Robertson has been rescued, and Umra Khan is a fugitive, we are now at liberty to ask the Government, what is to be the next scene in the trans-frontier drama? Had the relief party been too late, or had any serious disaster overtaken our troops among the defiles, we should doubtless have been launched upon an indefinite career of mountain warfare. But fortune has been very kind to Her Majesty's Ministers, so that they have not only passed safely through a most perilous crisis, but, in the strong position they now occupy, they have the opportunity of reconsidering the whole situation. And I earnestly trust that they will see their way to end these frontier aggressions, and return to the sound policy of Lord Lawrence, which was based upon respect for the rights of others, and which secured to us friendly neighbours on the frontier, a full treasury, and a contented people throughout India. The present expedition has indeed been an object lesson which must have made clear, even to the least observant and to the most prejudiced, the futility, the danger and the costliness of this marvellous policy of adventure, which has landed us in the present complications; which thinks to strengthen our position on the frontier by locating British officers at isolated points in this mountainous wilderness, where they are at the mercy of wild tribes, and far away from all support; with the result that we have to send a whole army corps two hundred miles in order to save their lives, and extricate them from the trap in which they are caught. Surely no scheme could be devised better calculated to lower our reputation, dissipate our resources, and produce chaos along our frontiers.

Now that the British Officers are safe Government has a free hand; and the action as regards the particular case of Chitral is mainly important as disclosing the principles upon which trans-frontier affairs will be conducted in the future. It will be remembered that the first object of the expedition, as stated by the Viceroy, was to rescue Dr. Robertson. But in the Proclamation addressed to the Border Tribes prior to the commencement of the operations, the Viceroy set forth a further object, and gave a definite promise. He said:

> "The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present and prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and as soon as this object has been attained the force will be withdrawn. The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territories through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interference with the independence of the tribes."

Now it appears that the flight of both Umra Khan and Sher Afzul has put an end to any present unlawful aggression on Chitral territory. But what is the nature of the measures by which such aggression is to be prevented in the future? This is a question of the utmost importance, for the nature of the measures will indicate the future course of action, whether in accordance with the wise policy of Lord Lawrence, or in continuation of the recent policy of adventure and aggression which has brought us into these political and financial straits. The question is one demanding the most earnest consideration of Her Majesty's Government. For how can future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory be effectually prevented except by occupying Chitral in force? And how can Chitral be occupied in force without keeping permanently open a road for wheeled traffic to Peshawur, a distance of 180 miles? So formidable an undertaking would inevitably lead to wholesale annexations and a vast expenditure.

It is the besetting sin of Liberal Governments when in office to shirk the duty of reversing a mischievous policy, and of enforcing in foreign and Indian affairs the good principles they professed when in opposition. With the strong forces of official opinion to struggle against, a Liberal

Minister finds it so much easier and more pleasant to accept the doctrine of continuity in administration. This suits our opponents exactly, especially when the policy is a risky one. It is then a case of "heads I win, tails you lose." If the venture ends successfully our opponents justly claim the credit of it, and make the success a ground for further encroachments. If, on the other hand, there is disaster they have the satisfaction of denouncing the incapacity of a Liberal Administration, and showing that it failed because it did not go far enough. In this trans-frontier question there is, at the present crisis, a choice of Hercules, a separation of two ways; and I trust that Ministers will not hesitate boldly to choose the better path. What then are the two courses which can be pursued? Briefly stated, the policy of Lord Lawrence and the school of practical statesmen associated with his name was to keep within the natural boundaries of India. Nature has kindly provided India to the North West with a mountain rampart, and has moreover manned that rampart with volunteer defenders, the wild and warlike tribes who alone can exist in these inhospitable regions; whose one valued possession is their independence; and who are prepared to defend that possession with their lives. What the nature of that mountain barrier is, how great the distances, how high the snowy passes, how deep and rapid the torrents, how rocky and inaccessible the defiles, and how brave its defenders, has been made very familiar to us during the last month by the daily telegrams from the seat of war. The policy of Lord Lawrence was to maintain that barrier, and to leave its brave defenders in the enjoyment of their cherished independence. This is a policy which commends itself to common-sense. When a farmer has a thick and thorny hedge round his orchard, he naturally preserves that hedge and regards the thorns and briars as his best defence against the thieves who would steal his fruit. To spend his substance in removing the thorns and making great gaps in the fence would surely be the height of folly. If there happen to be hornets' nests in the recesses of this hedge why should he go and get himself stung? Had he not better leave the hornets where they are in order that they may sting the thieves? The advisers who will not allow him to let well alone are his worst enemies. Similarly in India, any departure from the safe, wise, and humane policy of Lord Lawrence can bring nothing but ruin both political and financial. How does it profit us to shoot down the tribesmen who keep watch and ward in the fastnesses a hundred miles beyond our frontier? And can anything be more imbecile than to make invasion easy by spending vast sums in constructing roads through these wilds, thus paving the way for an invader? What does past experience teach us? It teaches us that nothing but good has ever come from Lord Lawrence's policy. All our frontier disasters, from the first Afghan war downwards, have been directly caused by some departure from those principles. On each occasion, when disaster has befallen us, we have for a time recognised the folly of the enterprises which have involved us in bloodshed and disgrace. But on each occasion the lesson has soon been forgotten. The restless professional instincts of a great army maintained in a high state of efficiency, and pining for distinction, keep official public opinion in India always in favour of an advance, and the military bureaucracy at Simla has always proved too strong for any control exercised from home. They can always bide their time till they find a Viceroy or a Secretary of State pliant to their will, or till a Russian scare allows them to carry out the schemes they are perpetually hatching. Thus it happens that our best Viceroys, like Lord Mayo, Lord Northbrook, and Lord Ripon, can do little more than put off the evil day until successors are found unwilling or unable to control the adventurous spirits by whom they are surrounded. I do not wish to be misunderstood in this matter. I cast no reflection upon our Indian military officers, among whom I have many of my best friends. On the contrary I fully recognise the fact that our army would not be fit for its duties if the men were not eager for active service and opportunities for distinction. If I keep a watch-dog to defend my house it is no dispraise of him to say that his jaws are strong and his teeth sharp, and that he is willing enough to use them. At the same time it is my duty to keep him on the chain, and to see that he only bites the right persons. He cannot be trusted to make the selection for himself. And so it is in the case of John Bull and his dogs of war. He alone is responsible for letting them loose. He must see that they do not put their teeth into the wrong persons, and it will be no sufficient excuse to say that all military opinion was in favour of the attack. As I will show presently, even military opinion is by no means unanimous in favour of these disastrous innovations. These new-fangled enterprises, of which Chitral is a good example, are called a "forward" policy. I say they are a backward policy as regards the safety of our Indian Empire, because they destroy our natural defences, dissipate our resources, and alienate our friends.

Let us consider very briefly the arguments put forward by Lord Roberts, who is by far the most important and responsible public man who favours the aggressive policy. In the *Times* of 13th April he sets forth his case. He calls Lord Lawrence's methods obsolete, and commends the policy "adopted of late years." Let us see how he proves the

necessity of the change, and how he justifies his bold assertion that had Lord Lawrence been alive he would have approved the altered policy. He first gives a description of the border tribes, as being practically independent, and inhabiting the mountainous region with which our frontier is coterminous from Quetta to a point 100 miles north of Gilghit, some 600 miles as the crow flies. These tribes, he tells us, can muster a quarter of a million of fighting men, armed with guns and rifles, many of them of modern patterns, and he describes them as extremely fanatical, but hardy and brave, and excellent soldiers when disciplined. He further declares that upon the attitude of these tribes the successful defence of India will in great measure depend; that they must be dealt with as a weapon of the utmost value to that side which can secure their co-operation; and that we should strengthen our cordial relations with them in order to "ensure their helping us to make the necessary preparations for maintaining their own independence." All this is excellent, but it suggests no departure from Lord Lawrence's policy. On the contrary the whole argument tells against these aggressive frontier schemes. If we base our hopes of friendly co-operation upon the determination of these tribes to preserve their independence, we surely should not begin operations by ourselves depriving them of that independence, and shooting them down if they prefer to remain free. Lord Roberts asks whether it is wise to leave these tribes to intrigue against us, and to present such valuable fighting materials to our opponents? To this I would reply that the spectacle of the Baluch tribes, the Waziris, the Hunza-Nagars absorbed by us is the strongest incentive we could give to the remaining border tribes to intrigue with our enemies in order to maintain the independence which their neighbours have lost. The only real way of conciliating the good will of these wild tribes is to convince them that we do not want their wretched country, and would not take it as a gift; and this is inconsistent with a policy of aggression. Certainly we do not wish to present these fighting materials to our opponents, but the most certain way of doing this is to threaten their independence. As Dr. Leitner has well said in a letter to the *Morning Post*, "the first invader is the enemy, the second is the deliverer."

This is the whole of the case, as stated by Lord Roberts. But let it not be supposed that even military opinion is unanimous. Curiously enough in the very same issue of the *Times* there appear, alongside of Lord Roberts's communication, letters from two other general officers of large experience, Sir Neville Chamberlain and Lord Chelmsford, who are entirely opposed to Lord Roberts's aggressive schemes. Sir N. Chamberlain, who commanded in the Ambeyla Campaign and spent many years in Afghanistan and on the frontier, regards our Chitral difficulties as the "inevitable outcome of the system introduced within the last few years," a system which has "brought about the unprovoked invasion of the territory of independent neighbouring tribes with whom we have no quarrel and with whom we have in late years lived on fairly friendly terms." This reads unpleasantly in connection with the telegrams we have been in the habit of reading from day to day, which recount how we "demolished a village or two," as part of a morning's work; how "the fire of the artillery and maxim-guns was very destructive"; how "the mountain guns speedily got the range and shell after shell burst among the natives"; and how "the enemy were compelled to give way before the furious fire that was poured into them, and suffered very heavily." Surely some sympathy must be felt for these brave men with whom "we have no quarrel," and whose only offence is that of defending their territory and homes from a foreign invader. In any case it will be admitted that such proceedings are a strange way of "strengthening our cordial relations" with these tribes, upon whose attitude, Lord Roberts tells us, "the successful defence of India will in great measure depend."

W. WEDDERBURN.

II.—LORD ROBERTS AND INDIAN FRONTIER DEFENCE.

BY J. DACOSTA.

Lord Roberts's letter, published in the *Times* of April 12, contains statements and expressions of opinion which are remarkable for their inconsistency with the opinions which his lordship previously entertained and has never publicly repudiated or qualified. For instance, it is stated in that letter that:

> "One can approve the feeling of repugnance with which thirty years ago many distinguished men viewed any unnecessary communication being held with the border tribes. Russia was still separated from Afghanistan by hundreds of miles of barren steppes. . . . . With Oriental avarice the Afghan tribes are ready to accept money from both England and Russia, while awaiting the development of hostilities; and there is the possibility, if left alone by us, of their joining our opponents at the outset by the promise of loot in India."

Let us compare these statements with the following extract from General Sir Frederick Roberts's despatch dated Kabul, May 29, 1880:

> "We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be flattering to our *amour propre*, but I feel sure that I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime."

The inconsistency mentioned above will at once

appear, especially when it is remembered that the Kabul despatch was written not thirty years ago when hundreds of miles separated Russia from Afghanistan, but only some fourteen years ago when Russia had conquered the intervening Khanates and occupied almost the same position as that which she now holds. It seems difficult, therefore, to account for opinions so diametrically opposed as those which are affirmed in the two extracts having emanated from the same mind.

Lord Roberts also says in his letter to the *Times* with reference to a Russian advance:

"The border lands, which will form the first theatre of operations must be made accessible to us by roads the construction of which, as has so often been proved, materially assists us in securing the good will of the people of the soil."

His Lordship does not state where, by constructing roads, we so often secured the good will of the people. In the borderlands of Afghanistan, at all events, the experience of the Indian Government points exactly in the opposite direction. Ill-will and active hostility have everywhere, from Waziristan in the south to Swat and Buner in the north, been the effect produced by our constructing military roads through tribal territories; and our roads, generally speaking, were injured or destroyed by the people when our troops evacuated the country —a fact which will be found stated in the reports of our frontier officers both civil and military. Moreover, in the Kabul despatch of May, 1880, Sir F. Roberts emphatically condemned the folly of British troops crossing the frontier and penetrating the mountainous region of Afghanistan in order to close with a Russian army marching on India. His deep conviction on this point was manifest in the studiously precise terms which he used for expressing it in the following passage of his despatch:

"The longer and more difficult the line of communication is, the more numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome; and so far from shortening one mile of the road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very mouth of the Khaiber."

It is sad to find Lord Roberts coming forward now to support a policy which he so uncompromisingly condemned when his recent experience in the Afghan war had enabled him to form a well-grounded opinion on the subject. To judge from the letters of other officers on the same subject, which were simultaneously or subsequently published in the *Times*, the policy of subjugating the independent tribes who dwell along the north-western frontier of India appears to be strongly condemned by our military experts, and no military authority, except Lord Roberts, has come forward to approve it. In order to form a correct opinion of the frontier policy which is being pursued in India, it is necessary to remember that every attempt which has been made during the last eighteen years to carry that policy into effect has signally failed, and that the military operations undertaken for the purpose, together with the subsidies paid to numberless tribal leaders for inducing the submission of the foe, while they resulted in an appalling sacrifice of blood and treasure and a serious loss of prestige, failed to secure the smallest advantage in return. Under these untoward conditions common prudence prompts that the policy in question and the possibility of executing it should once more be carefully considered by the nation before the deplorable results which it has already produced are further aggravated through irrational persistence.

The policy originated in the late Sir H. Rawlinson's Memorandum of 1865 advocating the advance of British troops with British agents in Central Asia, as a check to Russian progress in those regions. It was insidiously alleged at the same time—doubtless in order to create a plea for spending Indian revenue in the undertaking—that the scheme would protect India against an attack from the great Northern Power. The Government of India, on being consulted on the subject, strongly condemned the scheme on the grounds specified in their despatch of January 4, 1869, the following passages in which deserve particular attention:

"We solicit a full consideration of the subjoined Minutes. Your Grace will observe that regard has been paid to the division and conflict of parties in Afghanistan and to the peculiar national characteristics of the people; to the difficulties of establishing, supporting and supplying troops in isolated positions and at a distance from our own territories; to the financial outlay which any strategic advance beyond our own border would certainly entail; and to the probable effects of such measures on the feelings and wishes of those classes of Her Majesty's subjects in India whom it is our object to attach to us by just treatment or, if necessary, to control by salutary awe. These considerations deserve fully as much attention as the gradual advance of Russia in Central Asia. We object to any active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by the deputation of a British officer with or without a contingent, or by the forcible or amicable occupation of any post or tract of country beyond our own frontier, inasmuch as such a measure would engender irritation, defiance and hatred, in the minds of the Afghans, without in the least strengthening our power for attack or defence. We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia if that Power seriously thought of invading India, as we should certainly decrease them if we left our own frontier and met her half way in a difficult country and possibly in the midst of a hostile and exasperated population. We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on India; and we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control."

Notwithstanding these very cogent objections, the Secretary of State for India adopted the "forward policy" in January, 1875, when Lord Salisbury, writing to the Viceroy on the 22nd of that month, said:—

"Though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty in those regions [Central Asia], the

aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to suggest the necessity of timely precaution. I have, therefore, to instruct you to take measures for procuring the assent of the Amír to the establishment of a British agency at Herat. When this is accomplished, it may be desirable to take a similar step with regard to Kandahar. I do not suggest any similar step with respect to Kabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people. An English agency at Herat will be an indication of the English solicitude for the safety of our allies."

This despatch clearly shows that the aim of the new policy was not to protect India from any existing or threatening danger, but to promote what the British Ministry in 1875 (shortly before the breaking out of hostilities between Russia and Turkey) assumed to be Her Majesty's interests in Central Asia. When war, therefore, became necessary for the execution of that policy, constitutional usage required that Parliament should be asked for the needed supplies—a course intended to impose on the Ministers of the Crown the wholesome obligation of justifying their policy in Parliament before they involved the nation in war. That important obligation, however, was eluded in 1878 through the appropriation of Indian revenue to defray the expenses of the Afghan war; and the same irregular proceeding was adopted with respect to every subsequent trans-frontier military operation undertaken by the Government of India. This course of action also violated the 21 and 22 Vic., c. 106, sec. 55, in which it is laid down that:

"Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian possessions or under sudden or urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by H.M. forces charged upon such revenues."

That no sudden or urgent necessity existed when the above provision of the Act for the better government of India was deliberately disregarded, was shown in the Prime Minister's speech on Lord Mayor's day, 1878, when he said:

"So far as the invasion of India in that quarter is concerned, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that it is hardly practicable. The base of operations of any possible foe is so remote, the communications are so difficult, the aspect of the country so forbidding, that we have long arrived at the opinion that an invasion of our empire by passing the mountains which form our North-Western frontier is one which we need not dread."

In conclusion, let me call the attention of the readers of INDIA to the grave fact that an unwise and most unfortunate policy, inaugurated and prosecuted through unconstitutional means, has produced results the most disastrous—results which may be summarised as follows:

I. The unsuccessful Afghan war commenced in 1878 and the humiliating conditions submitted to in July and August, 1880, for bringing that war to a close;

II. The equally unsuccessful expeditions subsequently employed for the subjugation of the border lands of Afghanistan;

III. An enormous addition to the Indian debt;

IV. Deep discontent throughout India caused by oppressive taxation imposed for defraying military charges; and

V. Our present critical situation in India, with regard to Chitral.

These results justify in a remarkable manner the objections to the "forward policy" which were so strongly urged in the Indian Government despatch of January 4, 1869; and the persistence of the Secretary of State in adopting in 1875, and in subsequently maintaining, a course of action which both reason and experience had shown to be unsound and disastrous, would not have been possible but for the virtual irresponsibility to Parliament which that Minister acquired, in a great measure, through the sacrifice of Indian interests which it was his duty to protect.

J. DACOSTA.

III.—THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT AND CHITRAL.

BY AN EX-DIPLOMATIST.

It cannot be sufficiently impressed on the natives of India that the ruinous expenditure which the expedition to Chitral involves is due to Russia insisting on England giving a tangible proof of her influence right up to the limit now fixed for her sphere by the Pamirs agreement. This explains why war was commenced on the 1st April, when it was only on that date that our ultimatum, the receipt of which by Umra Khan has not been proved, enjoined on that freebooter to leave Chitral, so that no time was given to see whether he carried out our wishes or not. This is also why we were prepared to push on for Chitral even if Dr. Robertson had been relieved before now. That he should have refused to evacuate the Chitral fort or to come to terms with Sher Afzul, the rightful claimant to Chitral, on the puerile ground of an insolent letter from the latter, is another proof in the same direction. As with Chilas, it was necessary to provoke the Chitralis into resistance, with the view of the assertion of our power, on which Russian diplomacy threw a doubt, so as to compel us to bore through the various ranges of mountains at *our* expense and in *her* eventual interests as the deliverer of tribes, among whom *vendetta* for the relatives that we have slaughtered is a sacred duty that can only be deferred till the opportunity arises for its fulfilment. Just as Oksakoff's mission to Kabul was answerable for the war with that country, just as the few hundred roubles given by the Russian Geographical Society to Colonel Grombcheffsky to intrigue with Hunza

involved us in the wanton campaign for the subjugation of Hunza-Nagar, so also have the nibblings of Colonel Yonoff and others on the Pamirs drawn attention to the hitherto unknown countries between Peshawur and the Oxus, with the result of inflicting an irreparable blow on the finances and the contentment of India. When history comes to be written, not by servile officials but by independent enquirers, it will be found that no more unjust series of wars has ever been waged than that which, beginning with the practical annexation of Kashmir under false pretences and the disposal of its treasure, trampled on our own traditions of not extending our sway beyond the Indus in that direction. No wonder that the silence of the agents that provoked the massacres at Chilas and Hunza has been purchased by promotion and decorations.

I trust that the Liberal party will not refrain from a thorough enquiry into the causes of the Chitral Expedition, simply because it is a Liberal Ministry under which it so happens that this war has taken place. We cannot sufficiently urge the evacuation of all districts now occupied, or in course of occupation, by our troops, as soon as the objects avowed in our proclamation to the tribes, namely, the withdrawal of Umra Khan from Chitral and the relief of Dr. Robertson, have been achieved. If there is anything even more detestable than the Jingoism that now again is seeking to pick a quarrel with the Amír of Afghanistan by accusing him of having allowed Sher Afzul to escape, it will be the subservience of Radicals to party when the great principles they represent are at stake. Expediency, no less than humanity, bids us to have done with the slaughter of unoffending tribes or with their costly subjugation. On this subject the letter of the veteran hero of Ambeyla, Sir Neville Chamberlain, in the *Times* of the 23rd ultimo, may well be contrasted in its sober and thoughtful treatment of a subject of which he is *facile princeps*, with the vapourings of Mr. Vambéry in the same issue. If ever it has become clear to the careful reader that this Professor was a Jingo Agent rather than a person really acquainted with the diplomacy of the Central Asian question since the Granville-Gortschakoff Convention of 1872, it is when he congratulates England in general and Lord Roberts in particular on the Chitral expedition, *as opposed to Russian encroachments*, when it really *invites* the Russians to come as deliverers of practically unarmed tribes that, without the faintest sense of chivalry, we have been decimating with our Maxim guns. The Swatis are a physically weak, and morally timid, race and among them most were on our side. Bajaur had been practically won over long ago by our presents to its religious and other leaders and by our sowing disunion among its chiefs; but there still remain the more formidable Buneris and the Mohmands to reckon with, if we should remain near their territories after the capture of Chitral. What an irony on our expensive operations, intended to practice our troops and new weapons on the *corpus vile* of the natives of the intermediate Anglo-Russian zone, to remember that *we* did not, after all, either turn out Umra Khan from Chitral or relieve Dr. Robertson, for it was to the Khan of Dîr (whom we had originally encouraged Umra Khan to dispossess), that we owe both the final collapse of Umra Khan and the relief of Dr. Robertson. Indeed, had peace or economy been our object, all and more than has been achieved could have been gained by friendly overtures, but our aim was a war at all cost and in defiance of all principle. The questions asked in Parliament either meet with evasive answers or are frustrated on some technical point known to the official "devil's advocate." What is required is a Parliamentary Enquiry into the whole series of criminal blunders beginning with the reoccupation of the Gilghit Residency. To pose now as the asserters of the rights of Kashmir or Chitral merely adds insult to the injury that we have inflicted on both countries, is a pretext laughed at by the tribes, and is contradicted by the simple fact that Kashmir did not call in the British troops at all, but was made to contribute its own quota to the expedition by the Paramount Power.

IV.—THE DARK SHADOW BEHIND CHITRAL.

By AN ANGLO-INDIAN.

WHILST the London press is revelling in the luxury of columns of "ready copy" with sensational news from the Hindu Kush, and newsboys shout "Great Fight with Umra Khan," "Brilliant Military Feat by Colonel Kelly," "Chitral Garrison Relieved," and so on, there is much more serious matter for thought in the minds of public men who cherish any sense of responsibility. No man who claims to come under this category has now any right, in respect of the great imperial question now pressed on us, to excuse his inertness by the indolent plea that he "does not know what it is all about." Such men ought to know, even if they have only thought over the subject since February, when it has been forced on the public mind by the signal breakdown of the Indian Government's infatuated policy, pursued far beyond the boundaries of India, during the last fifteen years. In the copious telegrams spread before them for nearly three months past—which are in some degree a credit to the effective journalism of our day—supplemented as these have been by duly edited official statements from the India Office, there has been matter enough on which they could form a judgment and seek for further information.

This, in most needful details, has been forthcoming in the columns of the *Times*. Men such as

Lord Roberts, who are eager to "praise the bridge that has brought them over" and landed them in honours and decorations, have to the best of their ability set out such explanations and apologies as they can find on behalf of the reckless policy of meddling and invasion in the barren mountains of Afghanistan and High Asia. This now stands condemned by its dismal and disastrous failure—that not at the cost of England, but of the helpless and unfortunate people of India. On the other hand, men of far more experience and weight than that of the abettors of these revolutionary aggressions of the Indian Government and the India Office, have had their say to sufficient extent to leave our own public men without excuse for delaying to grapple with the wantonly invited peril that still confronts the British Empire in the East. Civilians such as Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir James Lyall, with others of equal weight (who have reserved their names); and men of large military and political experience such as General Neville Chamberlain, Major Raverty, Colonel Brownlow, and General Charles Gough, have fairly placed the other side of the shield before the hitherto supine British public, more especially in the *Times* of April 12th and 13th. To those spontaneous communications, if there were no other material, we can fairly appeal as affording conclusive condemnation of the unspeakable folly of the long series of political intrigue and military aggressions that have been carried on *outside* of India during the last decade and a-half, whilst glowing versions of "the moral and material progress" of that Empire have been officially published.

In other columns will be found selections from those convincing protests. At present I only propose to make a few comments on the remarkable letter by "An Expert," to which the *Times* gave its due significance of large type in its issue of the 13th ult. This contribution to the real burning question of the day is studiously moderate in tone. At several points it indicates that the writer thinks more deeply than he cares to avow, and that he could speak more strongly if he had permission. In passing, one may invite him so to do. His opening remark is of immediate practical moment. It is to the effect that it will be much to be regretted if the "exciting scenes" in the Hindu Kush regions should be allowed to "monopolise our attention, and cause us to lose sight of the far more important question of which Chitral is merely a branch—namely, the general trans-frontier policy of the Government of India." This admonition cannot be too closely heeded just now. General Sir Robert Low's big army has given, and will give a good account of itself. As "An Expert" remarks: "General Low will, we may confidently hope, reach Chitral in time [though Colonel Kelly may be in first]. It is then that our real difficulties will begin." To this I may respond, those "difficulties" began and were deliberately invited years ago—as already explained ten times over in these columns. This division of that demented and disastrous course, which, under successive Secretaries of State, the Indian Government has been weakly permitted to pursue, began in or about 1890. It was under the Secretaryship of Viscount Cross and the Viceroyalty of the Marquis of Lansdowne, when—the resources and troops of Kashmir having been seized for the purpose—expeditions were sent up to the foot of the Pamirs, and the independence of Hunza, Nagar, Gilghit, and the rest were destroyed, the Indian Government's Residents being placed in charge. Though Chitral was under no subjection to Kashmir, it was in like manner, though by special political chicanery, brought under subjection to Simla, and our puppet Mehtar set up—with the result we now see.

The lessons of experience so wilfully disregarded in the case of Chitral, a "mere branch" of the Indian Government's malign aggressive policy, are referred to with much force in "Expert's" fourth paragraph, which opens thus—"It seems to be assumed that the Indian Government has been taken by surprise. I cannot believe this to be possible:" and towards the close of the same telling passage, he again says—"I altogether refuse to believe that the Indian Government was so blind and unstatesmanlike as not to have seen the possible consequence of its policy." Here, however, with due deference to "An Expert" I venture to remark that in his seclusion, he can scarcely have kept an eye on the plots and scheming that have gone on at Simla—and, I fear, nearer home—during the last dozen years or more. Nor does he allow for the infatuation that besets men who find themselves left with irresponsible, and, virtually unlimited departmental power, while the higher and responsible authorities who should have controlled them, have slumbered, or alternately abetted and condoned their abuse of that secret, but too effective power. It is not too much to say that when—perhaps in the year 1900—the now carefully hidden records and despatches of the Simla Political Department's proceedings shall be dragged into daylight, it will be seen that transactions have been carried on, similar, in political turpitude and constitutional iniquity, to those that, in the sixteenth century, cost Strafford his head. But in these days whilst vital matters of State policy are obscured by the futility of Parliamentary debates, our jurists have lost touch of their constitutional functions; so that some of the more serious offences against statutory law and the interests of the community go unpunished, and, as in the case of these secret transgressions committed under that *Nominis et umbra* we call Indian Government, seldom meet with so much as formal rebuke.

It is in this direction that "An Expert" is far too reserved and confiding. Perhaps it is too much to expect that, even after years of personal freedom, he should be able to rise above the habits and instinct of official subordination. He remarks, incidentally, that "it would be rash to offer a final opinion (as to interference in the domestic affairs of Chitral) until we know all the facts of the case." And he is so humble-minded as to plead that "At present the Government only is in possession of the necessary information." While this affords undesigned evidence of the entire sincerity of the writer, it says little for his continuous observation of recent and current means of assessing "all the facts of the case"—whether applying to Beluchistan on the south, to Afghanistan on the west, or High Asia on

the north. As to this latter division, that, for instance, was specifically exposed at the time in the *Asiatic Quarterly Review;* while, as to the rest, the successive steps in the intriguing, grasping, and aggressive schemes of the Simla politico-military conspirators, those have been continuously revealed, often furtively, sometimes ostentatiously in two journals, one here and the other in India. To the few who could read between the lines, these unauthorised, but too authentic *communiqués* have told "all the facts of the case" needed to form a decisive judgment on the policy which has landed the Indian Government in deficit and disaster. Meanwhile, the text of despatches, minutes and orders, which would have sufficed to fix responsibility have been systematically withheld. The true political side of the shield has been kept dark; while the shining and decorated side has been exhibited to bemuse and deceive the British public. To these two opposite causes—the systematic suppression of authentic records, and the cunningly contrived versions which tell only half the truth and that to misrepresent it—must be attributed the torpidity and inertness shown by our public men, including the average member of Parliament, in presence of this crisis.

Let us revert to "An Expert." His own sound judgment and good sense are obscured by his almost superstitious belief in the value of official information persistently bottled up. For instance, he seems to suppose it possible there may be "reasons and motives which actuated the Indian Government" that may go to prove that it "is wise to annihilate the defences which nature has furnished us against the invader by opening out . . . . this barren country by forming depôts of supplies and by constructing military roads through those pathless wastes." This is a brief and tolerably full description of the unspeakable folly that took the Indian Government's troops beyond the Himalaya—which have now dragged a whole army division after them. Of course "An Expert" is too well behaved to stamp on that folly; he only says he has "grave doubts," and meekly asks for "further information." Information, indeed! Yes: parliament, the country, and possibly the Courts of Law have yet to be informed who and what are the men, who, in defiance of the Statute of 1858 and in utter scorn of Parliamentary control, have wantonly destroyed the natural defences of India by going outside of them; and who in pursuance of this insensate course have squandered tens of millions of those resources on which the very existence of the Indian population depends. Further "information" also, as I have already hinted, is needed to show who and what are the higher authorities here who have permitted and abetted the Simla and other active offenders in their lawless course. Now, if "An Expert" will, for once, overcome his undue modesty and point out these obstinate or guilty wreckers inside the British-Indian commonwealth, he will do inestimable service to the Empire.

There are only two other points in this suggestive letter to which I can refer. The writer warns all concerned that the "new" frontier policy "may involve us in the most costly and tedious operations which we have taken since the suppression of the Mutiny." Here, again, "An Expert" is somewhat behind the time. This "new" policy outside of India has been going on—with some slight check in 1882-4—for eighteen years past. As to cost of the Mutiny, that used to be reckoned at forty to fifty millions: but the destructive policy now exposed has already cost nearly twice that awful sum—though, as England has only paid a trifling five millions towards that wicked waste, our governing classes here care next to nothing about that criminal waste of other people's money. The other point is that the writer exposes the "demarcation" delusion. He shows that the boundary pillars are fudge, except so far as they will be followed by cantonments (already being laid out in Waziristan); and that involves annexation, as onerous as it is costly.

For the rest, one may ask any sceptics or doubters regarding this urgent question of our time to read, learn, and inwardly digest the statements and arguments of General Sir Neville Chamberlain in the *Times* of April 23rd. AN ANGLO-INDIAN.

V.—AN APPEAL TO LANCASHIRE.

In view of the meeting of the National Reform Union, announced to be held at Manchester on May 1, the following "open letter" to the electors of Lancashire may be not inopportune:

> "What you want is a new and a wiser and a broader policy, and that policy, I much fear, you will never have from the Government of Calcutta, until the people of England say that it is their policy and must be adopted."—JOHN BRIGHT.

TO THE ELECTORS OF LANCASHIRE.

Fellow Citizens,—Your newspapers have been telling you during the past few weeks of the War in Chitral, and the gallantry and courage of British and Indian soldiers in cutting their way through the warlike tribes that separated them from your fellow-countryman Dr. Robertson.

You have admired, and admired rightly, the unfailing courage of our troops, but have you asked yourselves what business we have in Chitral at all, or what advantage is to be gained from this expedition and from the far-reaching policy in which it is but the latest incident?

THE POVERTY OF INDIA.

You know—for the recent imposition of duties on cotton goods imported into India has brought the fact home to you—that Indian finances are in a grievously embarrassed condition. Have you asked yourselves what must be the cost of these fruitless expeditions beyond the frontier, and whether the import duties are likely to be abolished while this drain upon the resources of the impoverished Indian taxpayer is permitted to continue?

Let us glance back at the origin of this "Forward" Policy, which has been well defined as demanding unwise precautions against imaginary dangers.

Its ostensible purpose is to protect India against foreign, and especially Russian, invasion, by securing the passes and planting fortified outposts in the inhospitable regions far beyond the Indian frontier.

INDIA'S NATURAL MOUNTAIN BARRIER.

But the fact is that India has a natural mountain

barrier of enormous extent. Before the costly and futile "forward" policy was inaugurated by ambitious military officers, who found no opportunity of distinguishing themselves in times of peace, the frontier of British India, westward of the river Indus, was formed by a chain of mountains running southward from the Hindu Kush into Sind, and serving as a natural wall between the Punjab and Afghanistan.

The "forward" policy throws away the unique advantages of this natural line of defence, and not only goes to meet the enemy on equal terms, but also breaks down the strong barrier of brave and independent tribes which would otherwise protect India against Russia.

You remember that in 1858 the work of governing India was transferred from the East India Company to the Crown.

In 1864, Sir John Lawrence, whose whole life had been spent in the service of India, was appointed Viceroy.

It was during his Viceroyalty that the "forward" frontier policy was mooted, but Sir John Lawrence, as the historian says, "with a polite but plain-spoken negative brushed aside the rash proposals which emanated from Bombay and Sind."

For example, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, dated January 23rd, 1867, Sir John Lawrence, writing of "a proposal which has for its ultimate object the occupation of Quetta by a British force," said:

> "We"—that is, the Government of India—"are unanimously opposed to the project, and have conveyed our rejection of it to the Bombay Government in decided terms."

Similarly, under date January 17th, 1867, the Secretary to the Government of India (Foreign Department) wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay:

> "His Excellency has deliberately decided in Council that an advance to Quetta is not desirable."

THE FORWARD POLICY "UNNECESSARY AND IMPOLITIC."

Again, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, dated February 23rd, 1867, Sir John Lawrence wrote:

> "The Political Superintendent on the Sind frontier was desirous to make Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan's presence at Quetta a pretext for our undertaking a military promenade in Beloochistan. We summarily disallowed so unnecessary and impolitic a project."

Finally, Sir John Lawrence, in a memorable Minute dated October 3rd, 1867, summed up his objections to the whole policy:

> "The paramount consideration in my mind has always been, and still is, a regard for the true interests of the State. I am convinced that we can gain nothing, but are pretty sure to lose a great deal in prestige, in honour, in the valuable lives of our officers and soldiers, by interfering actively in the affairs of Central Asia; and that, so far from strengthening our tenure of India, we may thus shake it to its very foundations. Nor am I insensible, I admit, to the financial aspect of the question. I know well what are the wants of India; how infinite are the material requirements of this country; how limited is the accumulation of capital; how obnoxious is every description of new taxation to all classes of the people. I am, therefore, most desirous not to throw away the public money on expeditions and wars, which may be honourably avoided, and in this view I decline to be led away to engage in a course of policy which too surely ends in such results;"

And again:

> "If we proceed to meet Russia in order to prevent her approach to India, we give her so much vantage ground; for we lessen the distance she has to march her armies while we increase the interval between our own troops and their true base of operations."

Lord Mayo, who became Viceroy in 1869, and Lord Northbrook, who became Viceroy in 1872, loyally maintained Sir John Lawrence's frontier policy—the approved and wisely conservative policy of the Government and the people of India.

Unfortunately, Lord Lytton, who became Viceroy in 1876, succumbed to the pressure which his predecessors had so wisely and firmly resisted.

EXIT, SIR J. LAWRENCE: ENTER, LORD LYTTON.

It was in Lord Lytton's time that the rational frontier policy was first signally departed from.

In 1878 war was declared against Afghanistan.

Since that time the history of Indian "frontier policy"—or, to speak more accurately, "trans-frontier policy"—has been a history of wars, excursions, and alarms.

Between 1884 and 1886, for example, 2¼ millions were spent upon that occupation of Quetta which Sir John Lawrence and his Government had "summarily disallowed" as "unnecessary and impolitic."

THIRTY MILLIONS IN FIFTEEN YEARS.

During the last fifteen years the policy of trans-frontier aggression has cost nearly thirty millions of money.

The invasion of Chitral, which, at the outset, was almost unanimously condemned by public opinion in India, is only the latest move in this ruinous and senseless game.

I ask you, Electors of Lancashire, what you think of this precious "policy."

Remember that the responsibility for governing India rests upon you as electors.

Remember that military "experts" are only too apt to favour military aggression.

Remember that the cotton duties were imposed because military extravagance has brought India to the verge of bankruptcy while taxation in India is admittedly at the highest possible point.

Will you not therefore induce your representatives to co-operate, if they do not co-operate already, with the Indian Parliamentary Committee in insisting upon a policy of peace, retrenchment, and reform in the administration of the affairs of our Indian fellow-subjects?

Yours sincerely,
AN ENGLISHMAN.

"Our local functionaries must not be trusted in India, any more than they are in Great Britain and Ireland, to guide Imperial affairs. Almost in direct proportion to the degree of their departmental dexterity, and the length of their Eastern residence, they are generally incapacitated for the higher branch of politics. A clear view of Imperial operations can only be obtained from the central watch-tower."—MAJOR EVANS BELL.

OPINIONS OF SOME EXPERTS.

I.—GENERAL SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.

General Sir Neville Chamberlain wrote to the *Times* of April 12th: The necessity for immediate advance and the route adopted have brought about the unprovoked invasion of the territory of independent neighbouring tribes, with whom we have no cause of quarrel and with whom we have in late years lived on fairly friendly terms. These tribesmen are too brave not to resist what they believe to be a first step towards the destruction of their independence; and this resistance—considering the immeasurable superiority of our arms and organisation—can only end in great loss of life to themselves and desolation to their families.

And after our power has been asserted what is to follow? If we withdraw from Chitral we leave an enemy behind who is sure to return to power, when our position will be far less favourable than it was before we interfered in their internal affairs. If we remain in Chitral, Bajaur, and Swat, the tribesmen will only be kept quiet by our retaining, at great annual cost, a sufficient force in the valleys to overawe them. Reduce or withdraw that force, and they will rise again; for their love of independence is not to be subdued, nor is peace to be preserved by us unless our sword is kept hanging over them. No British force or British agent can be in those valleys with the goodwill of the great mass of the people. Furthermore, the system of native rule is in English eyes so objectionable that our officers who may be stationed in such positions will always find cause for interference, to be assuredly followed by still further control, practically ending in annexation.

To make a military road through Swat and Bajaur and to expect to keep it open without coming into conflict with the tribesmen is, to my mind, devoid of reason. It must involve the eventual subjection of those tribes—unless the Government of India will, under every circumstance, abstain from all interference with the internal control of those valleys and will, further, bribe the chiefs and their clans with a sufficiency of rupees to satisfy their greed for money. To do this would be to place the Swatis and Bajauris somewhat in the same position as that now occupied by the Afridis of the Khaiber Pass, but with this weighty difference, that in the Khaiber protection has only to be afforded for caravans passing on fixed days through barren and uninhabited mountains, whilst in the other case a safe conduct would be needed at all times for troops and followers, often obliged to pass over cultivated lands and near to villages, and consequently brought into close contact with the people. It has also to be remembered that if the Khaiber be closed other routes are available for caravans, whereas the closing of the Swat road would again isolate the posts beyond the Peshawur border.

My opinions are not founded upon a hurried ride through a new country inhabited by a people entirely strange to me, but upon four years spent in Afghanistan and about nine years on the Trans-Indus frontier. During all this time I was in constant and intimate intercourse with every class of the people of the country. There is a Persian proverb, "The whelp of a wolf will be a wolf," and the truth of that saying will continue to be proved long after future generations have passed away.

Again, General Sir Neville Chamberlain wrote to the *Times* of April 23rd:—Probably no Indian statesman has ever been so deeply impressed as was John Lawrence with the urgent necessity of India being made to live within its income, and to this end his frontier policy was guided upon these simple axioms—to curtail all unavoidable military expenditure; to live in friendly relations with the *de facto* Amír and the people of Afghanistan; to maintain peaceable relations with the independent border tribes; and to avoid being drawn into any policy which should lead these tribes to turn to the Amír of Kabul rather than to the British Government. Indeed, it was his opinion that for many reasons it was preferable to have independent tribes for our neighbours rather than be brought into more extended contact with subjects of the Amír of Kabul. The success attendant upon this policy is a matter of history. It was only when it was departed from by the military occupation of Quetta and by injudicious interference in the affairs of Afghanistan that the seeds of distrust were sown in the mind of the Amír Shere Ali. He then became angered and distrustful, and began to doubt whether his independence might not be better secured by relying upon Russia rather than trust to the encroaching policy of the Government of India.

We are now assured that, because of the further advance of the Russian frontier southward, the Lawrence policy can no longer be efficacious, and that, could the voice of that able and far-sighted man reach us from the grave, it would be used to urge on the advance of the British outposts. I altogether discredit the assertion, and I go further and say that I believe his counsel would be, the nearer the approach of Russia the greater the necessity for acting in the manner most likely to secure to England the good will of the frontier tribesmen and of the people of Afghanistan.

As a matter of fact, it is now some years since the old policy has been discredited, and departed from, with the inevitable result that the military expenditure has increased by leaps and bounds. To extend the new order of things means to add continuously and in an increasing measure to the burden of the Indian taxpayer; and where is the money to come from, and what is the good to be gained? Is it reasonable to suppose that the Afghan nation will be made friendly by having an unpopular Amír forced upon them or maintained against their wishes upon the throne, or that our relations with the independent border tribes are "to be established on a firmer and a more friendly basis" by being deprived of the freedom which they and their forefathers for generations and generations have prized so highly? At any rate, that end is only to be acquired by conquest and by keeping them at all times under subjection by the domination of military posts.

My judgment leads me in an entirely opposite direction to that upheld by the progressists, and I think my view is supported by the circumstance

of an insignificant border khan having now forced the Government of India to call into the field 15,000 soldiers in order to restore British prestige along the frontier and throughout India. What would have been our position in the Peshawur valley and all along the Upper Indus borders during the dark days of 1857 if the thousands of tribesmen who inhabit the neighbouring valleys had considered that they had a great wrong to redress? Would they have captured and sent back to us the mutinous sepoys who sought refuge in their mountains or have flocked into our service and helped us to regain the provinces that had been lost through the defection of the native army recruited in Hindustan? Nothing of the sort; they would have captured the hated posts, have killed their defenders, and have brought disaffection and ruin to the Punjab.

II.—GENERAL LORD CHELMSFORD.

General Lord Chelmsford wrote to the *Times* of April 12th:—Mr. George Curzon, in his very interesting and instructive letter regarding Chitral, which appeared in *The Times* of the 28th inst., spoke of it as being a position "of immense strategical value."

Now a strategical position to be of immense value should be naturally strong as regards its local surroundings; so that it may be held by a comparatively small force against superior numbers. It should have a plentiful food and water supply, and should be in safe and easy communication with the base from which it must draw its supplies and from which it can obtain reinforcements.

All that Mr. Curzon can say on the first point is "that it is not commanded by such fire as the enemy will probably be able to direct against it," which means that it is only capable of resisting a badly armed force which have no artillery. As regards food supply, the country round is notoriously deficient; and as regards water the garrison must go outside the fort to obtain it from the river which runs under its walls—clearly an unsatisfactory, arrangement if the fort is closely beseiged. With regard to the line of communications, Mr. George Curzon admits that they are most unsatisfactory, so that on all the three essential points required to make it a position "of immense strategical value" Chitral is found wanting. Mr. George Curzon advocates, however, as a *sine qua non* to the occupation of Chitral the opening out of the direct route now about to be traversed by the force under General Low's command. Has Mr. George Curzon realised that the effect of making a road fit for wheeled carriage from Peshawur to Chitral, would be to give an invading force a shorter route and better than now exists? Under present conditions a European force advancing from the Hindu Kush towards India, *via* Chitral, could not venture to use this direct route to Peshawur as it would be unable to carry a sufficieny of food supply, as I will now endeavour to show. A mule, which is the only description of carriage fit for such a route, will not be able to carry much more than 150lb. in a mountainous country where there are no made roads. Along the 180 miles between Chitral and Peshawur there are no supplies procurable from the country itself. Every day, therefore, a certain amount of forage sufficient to keep the mule in condition will have to be taken from its load, which may be estimated at from 8lb. to 10lb. In 18 days, therefore, a mule will have consumed its own load. Now, the rate of marching over such a country as that between Chitral and Peshawur would not exceed ten miles a day, including halts; so that, with no opposition, the force would require 18 days to cover the distance. But as the mule during those 18 days will have eaten up the whole of its load, it follows that there cannot be sufficient for both man and beast without one or the other being deprived of what is necessary for its sustenance.

I venture most positively to assert that Chitral is a strategical position of no value whatever either to an invading or to a defending force. Its occupation has been a mistake for which we are now paying dearly, and I sincerely trust that when the object for which the force under General Low is about to advance is successfully accomplished we shall retire from Chitral altogether and be satisfied with the occupation of Gilghit, which possesses every strategical qualification in which Chitral is so deficient.

III.—GENERAL SIR C. J. S. GOUGH.

General Sir C. J. S. Gough wrote to the *Times* of April 16th: The frontier policy of the Government of India has been for the last half century largely influenced by the Russian advance in Central Asia; that advance has been so extraordinary as to rivet attention, and, as they have overcome such difficulties and traversed such distances, it seems to many as if nothing was impossible to them; hence has arisen a constant "dread," it might be called, but that it is largely mixed with hope and absolutely without fear, of a Russian invasion of India. To many gallant eager soldiers it is a firm belief that the Cossack and the Bengal Cavalry sowar are to measure swords somewhere on the frontier, and it is their great hope that the long talked of war may come off in their time. I cannot but sympathise with their aspirations, but it seems to me that as a policy this state of mind is ruinous to India. In anticipation of this invasion every path and pass by which a goat can cross the barren, rocky, and mountainous region which separates Russian territory from India has acquired immense strategical importance. Several years ago Macgregor wrote: "If England does not occupy Sarakhs for defence, Russia will do so for offence." It is this spirit which animates our strategists, and which I venture to say is a false principle. Any officer who has had to select a defensive position for a post in such mountainous countries as Afghanistan has experienced the difficulty of obtaining one that is not "commanded" somewhere by another further on; in the vain hope of finding a perfectly satisfactory front, he would be led on and on until he found he had gone far beyond his tether, and it seems to me that this is our way with regard to our frontier policy; and the question for consideration is whether it is a practicable event, this Russian invasion.

Without going very deeply into the history of our frontier wars, we can see by what is going on before us at the present moment what would be the magni-

tude of the attempt at an invasion of India on the part of Russia. If it requires three brigades of four regiments each, with a corresponding force of cavalry and guns, to advance a short distance into those inhospitable regions, what would be the force that Russia would require to attempt so huge a task? Where is the base from which she could safely advance, and whence could she draw her supplies and obtain her transport, and by what lines could she advance, and what would be the cost of such an undertaking? We know from our own experience in Afghanistan what difficulty we had in keeping our army supplied, and that to draw upon a poor country for food was to risk causing a famine in the land. But when an advance of Russia is thought of, somehow all these difficulties disappear. She has hundreds of thousands of men (somewhere in Russia), supplies are produced, on paper, from barren lands, and transport arrangements easily provided; but, as a matter of fact, I venture to say, a Russian invasion of India is a phantasy, a veritable nightmare to our Indian statesmen, a vain hope to our ambitious warriors. Russia is not likely to venture on so huge a task; it is altogether, in my humble opinion, beyond her means and her power, and, happily for her also, I think, beyond her inclination.

I fear to trespass too much on your space, but a calculation of the amount of money the Government of India has spent under the effects of this nightmare would be startling, commencing with our advance into Afghanistan in 1839, and the war that followed, to present times. The real danger to India lies not beyond but within her border. Let us keep our army thoroughly efficient and loyal, and let us rule India with justice, consideration, and firmness, and Russia can do nothing to hurt us. She might add to our troubles if internal affairs went wrong.

IV.—General Sir J. Adye.

General Sir John Adye, G.C.B., wrote to the *Times* of March 29th:—Mr. Curzon first dwells on what he designates "the immense strategical value of Chitral," which he considers a "most important frontier State, the veritable key of the middle Hindu Kush." He then goes on to condemn, as he has done before, the policy of the late Lord Lawrence, which he considers to have been pusillanimous and one of culpable blindness (see letter in the *Times*, January 24th, 1895).

The policy of Lord Lawrence, which was also followed by Lords Mayo and Northbrook when successive Viceroys of India, was, as is well known, to avoid as far as possible interference with Afghanistan and with the affairs of our frontier neighbours, and to endeavour by conciliation and occasional subsidies to promote commerce and friendly feelings on both sides. It was, and, in my opinion, is, a sound policy, which should always be carefully adhered to.

When, in 1878-79, we departed from that system and entered on a course of violence and interference we at once found ourselves involved in a great war in Afghanistan, which cost this country about twenty millions sterling. It was bad in policy and unjust in principle from beginning to end, but happily since that period we have reverted to the wise and prudent course followed by the late Lord Lawrence and his successors, and with the best results.

With regard to the alleged immense strategical value of Chitral as the key of the middle Hindu Kush, I would point out that it is one of the long narrow valleys enclosed on each side by mountains about 14,000 feet high, which radiate south-westerly from the northern main range. It has no roads, and is of very limited fertility; and Mr. Curzon himself, writing a few months ago from that part of the world, said that, although there are passes over the Hindu Kush, the difficulties and utter scarcity of supplies are so great that invasion is impossible (see letter in the *Times*, December 18th, 1894). Again, he describes our North-Western frontier as being "probably the most difficult, and certainly the loftiest mountain region in the world."

It is apparent, therefore, that nature has accomplished for us all that we require, and that the strategical value of Chitral will best be maintained by leaving it alone.

The present condition of affairs is, of course, grave and difficult. As our representative in Chitral is at the present moment shut up with a small force in the fort, and surrounded by hostile tribes, it is imperative that we should march to his assistance and succour, and, as the circuitous route *via* Gilghit is impassable at this season, we are compelled to move a large force from Peshawur northwards for nearly 200 miles through a most difficult, little-known country inhabited by tribes who are warlike and hostile. It is important that the public should understand the grave nature of the situation. As no wheeled conveyance can move in such a country, it is evident that not only our field-guns, but all supplies of food munitions, and stores will have to be conveyed on pack animals. The advance, therefore, must be slow, and from my experience during a smaller but somewhat similar campaign in the adjacent country of Buner (upwards of 30 years ago) the difficulties and the cost must be very great. On that occasion we were opposed by some of the very tribes from Swat, Bajaur, and Dir whom we are now again about to meet. At the close of the campaign in question there were about 8,000 of our troops engaged, and our casualties in action were upwards of 800, although we only penetrated a few miles into the mountains.

Our object in the present instance will no doubt be accomplished, and there may happily be some want of combination of the tribes which would lessen the difficulties; but I hope that as soon as our representative has been rescued we shall at once withdraw our troops and resume the old policy of forbearance, conciliation, and subsidies, from which, by untoward circumstances, we are for the moment compelled to depart.

V.—"An Expert."

"An Expert," in the course of a letter to the *Times* of April 13th, wrote:—At present the Government only is in possession of the necessary information, and, with the facts before it, it has decided that

interference between the blood-stained freebooters who are struggling for the possession of a few mud forts in these remote lands is necessary in the interests of the Empire, notwithstanding that interference involved, as the Government must have foreseen, the possibility of a costly and dangerous expedition such as that commanded by General Low. In order to justify this decision, the Government will be expected to prove that Chitral and the neighbouring States are, from a strategic point of view, vitally important; that they may be useful to us—which is difficult to believe—for offensive operations, and, if not, that it is wise to annihilate the defences which nature has furnished to us against the invader, by opening out and cultivating this barren country, by forming depôts of supplies in these wild tracts, and by constructing military roads in these pathless wastes. The Indian Government doubtless considered these facts, and it decided, in spite of the obvious objections, upon the policy which has been adopted. When we learn the reasons and motives which actuated the Government we shall be in a position to criticise and to condemn or approve. But we should not allow ourselves in our anxiety regarding Chitral to lose sight of the cause of the present troubles and to overlook the great and, indeed, momentous question involved—namely, the new frontier policy of the Indian Government. For a new policy has been recently adopted which may involve us in the most costly and tedious operations which we have undertaken since the suppression of the Mutiny. I allude, of course, to the policy which affects the belt of wild and warlike tribes south as well as north of Peshawur. Our former policy was ourselves to abstain from interference with their independence and to resent similar interference on the part of Afghanistan. This policy has been rendered very difficult of late years by the aggressive conduct of the Amír, who has claimed sovereignty over the tribes. More than once has his policy endangered our friendly relations with him. It was to remove this difficulty and danger that Lord Lansdowne despatched a mission under Sir Mortimer Durand to Kabul. The mission was quite successful, and Sir Mortimer Durand negotiated a treaty whereby the Amír renounced his pretensions and received in return a large increase of his subsidy. This was very satisfactory, and so far the proceedings of the Indian Government were not open, I consider, to hostile criticism. But the Government did not rest content; it determined on demarcating the new frontier. In the opinion of the tribes—and this must have been foreseen—demarcation meant annexation. *Hinc illæ lacrymæ.* There was resistance south of Peshawur, while north of Peshawur Umra Khan, an ambitious chief with a genius for war, a born leader of men, who found himself curbed and restrained by our Empire, took up arms in defence of his cherished independence and struck at the most vulnerable spot accessible to him—Chitral. Nor have the instincts of these wild tribes deceived them. The Indian Government may declaim and proclaim with the utmost sincerity, but annexation, in spite of themselves, must certainly follow demarcation. The frontier which is now being demarcated by pillars will be the frontier of British India, and the tribes included within that frontier must necessarily cease to be independent and must become British subjects. We shall be responsible for their orderly conduct, and how are we to discharge this responsibility except by coercing them into order by crushing them into obedience? Cantonments will be established among them—the sites, I believe, have been already selected—civil administration must follow our troops, with all its beneficial but unpopular concomitants, its education and schoolmasters, its law courts and attorneys, its sanitary regulations, its forest laws and its invariable satellite, the village money-lender. The result is inevitable. These warlike tribes will become peaceful cultivators, their swords will be beaten into plough-shares, they will learn the advantages of peace and comfort over fighting and hardships, and, like the Sikhs, will gradually lose their martial instincts. Truly a great triumph for civilisation; but how about the bill in blood and gold which must be paid? How about the recruiting field for our Army which it is the avowed object of the new policy to preserve?

Again, assuming that the policy is a wise and necessary policy, has an opportune moment been selected for its adoption? Could not the Government have waited till the finances of India were in a less critical condition? How is the money to be found except by loans in gold and consequently by increased taxation? Could we not have tided over present difficulties and maintained the *status quo* at least during the lifetime of the present Amír? Who knows what will happen when that great man ceases to govern Afghanistan—whether our policy may not then be recast and our frontier retraced?

I may here, perhaps, be allowed to allude to the suggestion which has been made that the Amír should be invited to co-operate by means of his army in the neighbourhood of Bajaur, with General Low. I cannot imagine a greater *reductio ad absurdum* of the new policy. We have paid the Amír to cease interference with certain tribes, and before the ink on the treaty is well dry we are to invite his interference and to pay him for interfering. For we cannot expect the Amír to give his assistance gratuitously. Reluctantly he renounced his authority over the tribes in question and left them to us to deal with. The Amír is a very astute and subtle diplomatist. Doubtless he foresaw the difficulties which we proposed to encounter with a light heart, and chuckled when we thrust our innocent hand into the hornets' nest. It would be childish to expect him to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us unless he is well paid in money or territory. This crude idea may therefore be dismissed.

I have ventured to suggest certain points regarding which the Indian Government must give satisfactory explanation before their frontier policy can be approved, and, having done so, I for one am quite ready to keep my mind open, as free from bias as possible, so as to consider in a judicial spirit the reasons and arguments which we may expect to find in the official papers, which no doubt will soon be published—papers which, I trust, will include, not only the collective opinion of the Government of India (that is, of the majority), but of individual councillors in India and at home.

VI.—MAJOR H. G. RAVERTY.

Major H. G. Raverty, late of the Bombay Army, wrote to the *Times* of April 13th: I am not an alarmist, but I must say that this expedition is a serious one in more ways than one. If such a rage had not been shown of late years for seizing what does not and never did belong to us, because the people happened to be weak and very poorly armed, while we are strong, and provided with the most excellent weapons, including artillery, and all means of offence possible, the cause for such an expedition would never have arisen. While crying out against Russia's aggressions we, taking lessons out of Russia's books, almost outdo her. Had we not commenced to appropriate Chitral, under pretence that it belonged to Kashmir, who has no right whatever to it, and never had, and manifested a desire to seize more and to carry out in that part the forcible appropriation of territory which has been exercised all along the eastern part of the Afghan State, these troubles would not have come about. The revenues of India, in their present crippled condition, will have a serious hole made in them to pay the enormous cost of all this.

It is quite a new feature in politics, and in logic too, I fancy, that a large tract of territory belonging to others, who have given no offence, other than being weak, and desiring to keep to themselves and preserve their independence—a great offence certainly—should be seized upon and occupied, and if the people resent it, to carry fire and sword into their homes because travellers in their peregrinations cannot make short cuts through their territory without even asking their consent. How would such travellers like their neighbours, or strangers at home, in order to make a short cut, to despatch a strong party of navvies to force a road through their estates or dwellings, and occupy them?

SOME OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

Commenting on the expedition to Chitral, the *Spectator* said on March 30th, in an article by a well-known hand:—

It is evident from what General Roberts says that the intention is to keep the road to Chitral permanently open, and to assume a general control over all the tribes from Peshawur right up to the desolate prairies on the top of the Hindu Kush. He said in his speech of Monday: "Some may wonder why so much stress is laid upon the extension of British influence over tribes with whose religious and domestic arrangements we have no intention to interfere, and whose territories we have no desire to annex. The reason why it is desirable for us to try and gain an ascendancy for good over the border tribes (looking at the question merely from a selfish point of view) is that they are a great factor in the defence of the North-West frontier of India. They number over two hundred thousand fighting men, and our frontier is conterminous with theirs for some eleven hundred miles. Thanks to the enlightenment of the present ruler of Afghanistan, our relations with that country are becoming more satisfactory than they have ever as yet been. But it is *just as essential* that we should be on satisfactory terms with the warlike tribes who inhabit the mountainous districts between Afghanistan and India. It will not do to leave them to themselves until the time arrives when we shall need their assistance, or at all events, their neutrality. Before that time comes they should have learnt to look upon us as friends, and to appreciate the benefits which civilised intercourse with us will confer upon them. Moreover, it is all-important that we should be able to pass through their territories, and make roads to those points which we should have to occupy in the event of India being threatened by a foreign Power." General Roberts is not the sort of man to make speeches of that kind if he knew that his superiors would disown them, and his meaning clearly is that we are to govern the whole mountain territory between India and the highest points of the Hindu Kush, at least so far that we can cut and protect roads through it, and can call upon its tribes to remain quiet with a compelling voice. We are to be felt as the paramount Power through a country nearly as large as France, with Alpine mountain ranges all over it, and with no fertility, as Captain Younghusband showed in his most interesting lecture of Monday, except in scattered village cases where the fruit-trees grow. In that country are scores of tribes, all used to intestine war, all brave, and all children incapable of continuous policy, whose decisions and promises cannot be relied on for six months at a time. That seems to us a most serious undertaking, and one to which the nation should attend; but unless a disaster happens, the nation will not attend to it for ten minutes; will read columns upon columns about rubbishy intrigues for the Speakership, most of them misdescribed, and will not even see that we are about to stretch British dominion, or at least British right of control, right up to the Roof of the World, to the furthest point we can reach without trenching on Russian territory. There is something magnificent, we frankly acknowledge, in that British indifference and calm; but is there not something just a little stupid, too?

We are not, be it remembered, pleading that this policy be abandoned. We cannot compel ourselves to believe it wise; but for all we know it may be part of the strange destiny which in India for ever hurries us northward out of the revenue-yielding plains into the sterile and hostile region of the mountains where there is little for us to do but fight continually, and nothing at all to get, and we have no right, as we have repeatedly admitted, to put our own judgment, though it accords with Sir John Lawrence's, against that of a wilderness of experts who all say that the only defensible ultimate frontier for India is the Hindu Kush. But we do wish we could rouse the English people to a sense that we are overpassing our mighty wall, the Himalaya, and taking up the government or protectorate or suzerainty—call it what you like—of the whole half-desolate region between that and the Hindu Kush, that we must cross it with roads and telegraphs, that we must keep up and connect an infinity of fortified posts, and that we must be ready at any moment to subjugate it in the event of a rising or defend it in the event of an invasion.

Lord Roberts says the tribes will help us, for we shall make them friends, and in one way that is, we dare say, true. The tribesmen will swarm to our regiments as they did to the regiments of the Great Moguls, and very excellent soldiers they will make nearly as good as Sikhs or Goorkhas. But friends! Will Lord Roberts trust any Pathan alive if the invader offers more than we do, or if the Pathan fancies that his secession will restore India to its old Mussulman rule? Invasion, with all its incidents, the overturn of old chiefs, the fines, the blowing up of villages, may secure friendship a century hence; but for the immediate future,—well, we suppose Pathans are human beings. Moreover, though we at least never forget that India is a military monarchy, and must accept the conditions of that position, the expense of this movement must not be left wholly out of calculation. The *Times* says we have already spent Rx. 128,000,000 beyond the frontier, and the *Times* leaves out the cost of military railways, the increase of the European Army, the expenditure on fortresses. We believe that besides the sum mentioned, the cost of the "forward policy" exceeds two millions a year, which, if we are to reign up to Chitral—and clearly if we are permanently to defend Chitral, we must in some sort reign over its approaches—will be increased sooner or later by another half-million. That is not an excessive sum to pay for the security of India, if, as Lord Roberts believes, we shall thereby attain the end, but we want Parliament to understand clearly that it is spent, that the fall in the price of silver is not the sole cause of the Indian financial difficulty, and that if we could but keep within our own garden-wall we should be rich; might cover India with railways, or if that were more expedient, might, in a generation, pay off the Indian gold debt. If we are driven forward, as so many Anglo-Indians believe, by some "manifest destiny" or other external and automatic force, so be it; but if we retain, as we fancy, the control of our own wills, we ought at least to know the facts, and not go plunging on with our eyes bandaged like those of a horse which is wanted to leap a flame. This expedition to Chitral is another step forwards in a very big invasion, and we ought to know more about it than we can learn from snippety little telegrams, chiefly occupied with the names of the officers who are to share in the chance of a great exploit.

The *Times* of Friday published a long letter from Lord Roberts arguing that we ought to keep Chitral, and assert what is practically sovereignty over all the Pathan tribes between India and the Hindu Kush. That will, he maintains, benefit those tribes, retain in our hands a strategical point of importance, and prevent the Pathans from joining the Russians when they invade India. General Neville Chamberlain, an officer of the first repute and much greater local experience than General Roberts, deprecates this policy, maintaining that the Pathan clansmen will be irritated by our invasion, and will, if we remain, only be kept quiet by a strong garrison, which will impair our resources both in men and money. The road from Peshawur, through Swat to Chitral, will of itself involve the ultimate subjection of all the tribes through whose territory it passes. The necessity of rescuing Dr. Robertson is admitted, but after that, General Chamberlain would, obviously, retire. In the present position of the British Army, it seems to us most unwise to increase the permanent demand on it, while the Treasury directly and heavily feels the annexation of those wild and disturbed hill countries. As to the possible hostility of Pathans, they will be more hostile as discontented subjects, and if not, they can add little to Russian strength. It is not fighting-men which Russia will ever want for any Asiatic enterprise.—*Spectator* (April 13).

As the Gilghit passes are blocked with snow, it will be impossible to deliver an effective attack on Umra Khan and his Chitral allies from that side, and it looks as if the Peshawur force will find itself involved in another "little war" of some magnitude. We should like to be surer than we are that it could not have been avoided.—*Manchester Guardian* (March 23).

We do confess that we view with a kind of despair the endless process of discovery by which one more pass, one more valley, is always found to be indispensable for the security of India. The Hindu Kush is enormous. As one sees its peaks and ridges and defiles lying on the map like the innumerable capricious creases of a crumpled newspaper on the floor one feels dismally that the insatiable desire of the militarists for a line of defence more immaculate than yesterday's, a desire that only grows by what it feeds on, is pushing us helplessly forward into a position which India may be unable to maintain without bankruptcy and unable to abandon without a loss of the prestige by which our Indian Government lives. The complete adoption of the forward policy must mean eventually the annexation of an immense extent of desert mountain, in which administration would be difficult and costly, and actual fighting frequent, which we should have to cover with roads, telegraph wires, and official and military posts, and from which no revenue would come. The Indian Empire already

> Staggering under the load,
> Atalantean, immense,
> Wellnigh not to be borne
> Of the too vast orb of her fate,

will be called upon to bear the whole of this new burden, and it is the duty of Englishmen to consider seriously which is the lesser evil for her of the two—the continuance of a possible increase of danger in the case of an invasion that is only possible, or the absolute certainty of a crushing addition to burdens which her financiers already scarcely know how to distribute so that they shall be tolerable.—*Manchester Guardian* (April 13).

Writing on April 23rd, the *Manchester Guardian* said: Now comes the real difficulty—that of deciding on the future of the country,—and with it the question whether the forward policy in Chitral has not been altogether a mistake. It is the old question of Sir Robert Peel—"Could not you leave it alone?" If we are to carry out throughout the border States which fringe the Indian Empire the policy which has been carried out in Chitral, we shall have our hands full. It is particularly important, if we may argue from the case of Chitral to the case of Afghanistan. The policy of the Indian Government has been to surround the frontier with a series of native "buffer" States, the most important of which is, of course, Afghanistan. It has been accepted as an axiom that the frontier must not run with that of another European State, but that these more or less independent Native States must be shoved in between. The principle on which our dealings with those buffer States should be conducted was laid down by successive Viceroys, but most clearly by Lord Lansdowne, as being one of non-interference in their internal affairs but absolute control over their foreign relations. The theory is a pretty one, but it will not work, as can easily be seen from the typical case of this very Chitral. By

an opportune coincidence, the well-known officer who is on his way to the front as the correspondent of the *Times* publishes in yesterday's issue of that journal an article on "The Causes of the War," which is nothing less than a succinct and extremely instructive history of our dealings with that country during the last ten years. The writer is a "forward" policy man of the most uncompromising kind, so that we may be sure that he has laid no undue stress on the inherent difficulties of our position. Nevertheless the one fact which he brings out above all others, whether consciously or unconsciously we do not undertake to say, is that Lord Lansdowne's policy is not and has not been carried out. It breaks down on the question of the succession. Strictly speaking, the suzerain State, if the Lansdowne policy is to be carried out, should let the claimants, of whom there are always several in an Oriental country, fight it out among themselves until the best man wins. But practically it is always compelled, or thinks itself compelled, to intervene in favour of its own nominee, and consequently the non-intervention in the internal affairs of the buffer State is a farce and a delusion. We intervene precisely at the most important moments, when intervention is most felt, and when it implies the greatest responsibility. That is always the history of "buffer" States. Armenia in the ancient world was such a State between Rome and Parthia, and it was the history of Armenia. It has been the history of Chitral, and there is too much reason to fear that it will be the history of Afghanistan. When the present Amír dies the succession is pretty sure to be disputed. If the Indian Government acts on the principles on which it has acted in Chitral, it will intervene in favour of its nominee, and the end of it will be another Afghan campaign to be added to its dismal and unnecessary predecessors. The interference of the Indian Government with Chitral began in 1885, when Lord Dufferin initiated with regard to that country the policy laid down by Lord Lansdowne in the terms we have repeated. From that time to 1892 we had no difficulty, as there was a strong and friendly ruler on the throne in the person of Aman-ul-Mulk. The "buffer State" theory works beautifully so long as such a ruler can be had. But man is mortal, and in September, 1892, Aman-ul-Mulk died, leaving seventeen sons, each of whom thought himself entitled to the succession. One son, Afzul-ul-Mulk, having the luck to be in Chitral at the moment of his father's death, seized the throne and defeated his elder brother Nizam, who took refuge at Gilghit. Afzul then killed most of his remaining brethren, was recognised by the Indian Government, and it seemed that everything was well with him. Unfortunately he had not only brethren, but an affectionate uncle, who, in the person of Sher Afzul, suddenly emerged from his exile in Afghanistan, killed his nephew, and was acclaimed by the Chitralis as their heaven-sent king. The next move came from Nizam, who left Gilghit, where he had been under our protection, and drove out Sher Afzul. Nizam was promptly "recognised" by the Indian Government, and he took the next decisive step by asking for a British "Resident." The latter was sent, and appeared in Chitral in the January of 1893. For two years Chitral was quiet and the Indian Government was comfortable, and then, on the New Year's Day of 1895, Nizam was murdered by one of the few brothers who had been left alive. This boy of eighteen, however, was hardly equal to the opportunity, and the uncle, Sher Afzul, once more put in an appearance from Afghanistan. But meanwhile the plot was thickening considerably. Dr. Robertson had moved into Chitral fort, and had under him a total force of some 340 men. In other words, the "buffer" State theory had vanished, and the Indian Government was interfering directly in the internal affairs of Chitral. Simultaneously a new and important personage came on the scene in Umra Khan, a highly capable Pathan, who for some years past had been building up a little warlike State of his own to the south of Chitral. He saw his opportunity in the confusion consequent on Nizam's murder, and invaded Chitral at the beginning of this year. He took Drosh about the middle of February, was joined by Sher Afzul, and the two, agreeing that whatever happened the British must be turned out, marched on Chitral fort. The promptitude of the Indian Government and the admirable conduct of the troops have just saved Dr. Robertson and his force in time. But, so far as Chitral is concerned, the "buffer" State theory has absolutely collapsed, and it is more than probable that a British force will stay permanently in the country. We believe that to be a waste of resources and a mistake. There is absolutely no limit to this wild-goose chase after scientific frontiers at the bidding of military experts. Chitral itself is no very great matter, but it is of the greatest importance as a type and a model. It prefigures what the Indian Government will do, or at all events will be urged by all the strength of the military party into doing, in Afghanistan when the next disputed succession comes about in that country, and the principles which have been worked out in Chitral point directly to another invasion of Afghanistan.

General Chelmsford pours ridicule on the notion that Chitral possesses any military importance. It is lacking in food and water supply, while the line of communications with Peshawur would be difficult to maintain. General Neville Chamberlain, who has had many years' experience of this border country, condemns the policy of interference as strongly as Lord Roberts advocates it. He is certainly corroborated by history when he says that intervention almost invariably leads to annexation and a largely increased expenditure.—*Liverpool Mercury* (April 13).

Notwithstanding the high authority of General Roberts there is a disposition among some of those who have had considerable experience in India, and who indeed may be said to have been brought up in India, to doubt the prudence of the policy which has recently been adopted, and which is now being carried out. Even if these wild mountainous districts can be successfully invaded and the British flag placed on the highest point of the Hindu Kush, we shall certainly not be released from having to maintain a considerable military force far away from what may be called the centre of gravity of our Indian Empire. Then the Russian Government will certainly not like to see British soldiers or Indian troops under British officers in the immediate neighbourhood of the Pamirs. The British and Russian Governments are now indeed said to be on very good terms; but they cannot be expected always to remain so, and if one thing is more certain than another, it is that an aggressive Russian policy in Central Asia, and in immediate proximity to India, will not be abandoned.—*Northern Whig* (April 5th).

While it must needs be difficult for the ordinary layman to decide between the "forward" and the more conservative school of Indian politicians, we may at least expect the former to tell us whether they have sufficiently considered the financial side of the question, and whether, at a time when we have secured an agreement with Russia and the fear of Russian aggression is at its minimum, and when Afghanistan is friendly, there still remains a necessity strong enough to justify so heavy an addition to Indian responsibilities.—*North British Daily Mail* (April 15).

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This Supplement consists of a VERBATIM Report, specially drawn up for "India," of the Debates on Indian subjects in both Houses of Parliament, and questions put on such subjects and the answers given to them, arranged chronologically, from March 25th to April 23rd.

Imperial Parliament.

March 25th.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THE INVASION OF CHITRAL.

Lord KNUTSFORD: I desire to ask whether the Government can give the House any further information about Chitral.

Lord REAY: Beyond the information given to the House on the 21st instant, in reply to Lord Cross's question, and a report identical with that which appeared in the newspapers about the melancholy loss of Captain Ross and his party near Boni, the Secretary of State has no information.

It is believed that the British Agent with 300 men is still invested in the Chitral Fort, and the Government of India have reported that the Chitral relief force will be despatched as soon as it can be made ready—by April 1, if possible. So far as the Secretary of State is aware, the Government of India have not recognised anyone as the new Mehtar of Chitral.

It is not known for certain where Umra Khan is, but he is supposed to be still in Chitral territory. Some of his men are reported by Lieutenant Jones to be holding the Fort of Drasan, to the north of Chitral. No information has been received from Dr. Robertson direct of later date than March 1st.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

EAST INDIAN RAILWAY BILL.

The East Indian Railway Bill was read a third time.

THE INDIAN TROOPSHIPS.

Mr. WILLIAM ALLAN asked the Civil Lord of the Admiralty how many troopships had been sold during the last two years: And whether it was the intention of the Admiralty to dispose of the rest of those vessels.

Mr. ROBERTSON: Three of the Indian troopships have been sold by the Indian Government. One of the Indian troopships was bought by the Admiralty, and may be shortly utilised as a powder hulk. None of the Imperial troopships have been sold; two ("Tyne" and "Wye") are still running. The "Himalaya" will be fitted as a coal hulk. The "Tamar" is shortly proceeding to Hong-Kong to be fitted as a receiving hulk. The "Assistance" may be shortly required as a powder hulk. The "Malabar," Indian troopship, is still running.

FLOGGING IN THE INDIAN ARMY.

Mr. HANBURY asked the Secretary of State for War whether, in view of the second reading of the Army (Annual) Bill having been put upon the paper for that day, he could state whether it was proposed in it to maintain the punishment of flogging in the case of Indian native troops, although it had been abolished in the case of all troops in the British army, including the black troops of the West India regiments:

And whether the intervention of the Secretary of State for India, as promised in Committee on this Bill last year, had led to any alteration of the law in that respect.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: The Secretary of State for India has been, and is still, in communication with the Government of India on this subject; but no change can take place till a Bill has been passed through the Legislative Council of India.

Mr. HANBURY: May I ask the hon. gentleman whether he is able to give the House any information as to whether the Government of India have arrived at any decision during the past year? The Under Secretary promised a year ago that he would communicate with the Government.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: I have answered the question in the terms put into my hands. Perhaps the hon. gentleman will put the question down.

THE INVASION OF CHITRAL.

Mr. CURZON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India a question of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether he can give the House any further information upon the state of affairs in Chitral; whether the British Agent is still invested in the Chitral fort, and, if so, what steps are being taken for his support or relief; whether the Indian Government have recognised a Mehtar of Chitral; and whether any further information is forthcoming as to the attitude of Umra Khan.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: Beyond the information given to the House on 21st instant in reply to Sir William Wedderburn's question, and a report identical with that which appeared in the newspapers about the melancholy loss of Captain Ross and his party near Boni, the Secretary of State has no information.

It is believed that the British Agent with 300 men is still invested in the Chitral fort, and the Government of India have reported that the Chitral relief force will be despatched as soon as it can be made ready, by the 1st April if possible.

It is not known where Umra Khan is for certain, but he is supposed to be still in Chitral territory. Some of his men are reported by Lieutenant Jones to be holding the fort of Drasan to the north of Chitral. No information has been received from Dr. Robertson direct of later date than 1st March.

So far as the Secretary of State is aware the Government of India have not recognised anyone as the new Mehtar of Chitral.

INDIA AND THE FINANCE ACT, 1894.

Mr. JAMES LOWTHER asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether section 20 of the Finance Act, 1894, already applied to British India and the feudatory native states to which British political officers were appointed; and, if not, whether steps would be taken with a view to the issue of the necessary order in Council.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer: Section 20 of th Finance Act, 1894, has been applied to British India by order in Council dated February 2nd, 1895. The order in Council does not extend the section to any part of India where the law of British India does not apply, and therefore it does not extend it to any feudatory native states.

March 26th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE MAHARAJA OF BHARTPUR.

Mr. Seymour Keay asked the Secretary of State for India, whether his attention had been called to a telegram published in the *Times* of the 18th instant, stating that as the Mahárájá of Bhartpur had shown himself incapable of governing his State, the British Resident would administer it until other arrangements were made:

Whether the present Mahárájá only ascended the throne on the death of his father about 12 months ago, and whether on that occasion the Government of India notified that the British Resident would condnct the Government for a period of 12 months:

What opportunity had the Mahárájá had of proving his capacity or otherwise for conducting his own Government:

And, could he state what he had done to merit so serious a punishment as appeared to have been inflicted.

Mr. George Russell: No information has been received beyond what has appeared in the newspapers. The Government of India have been asked to furnish a report by mail as soon as possible.

INDIAN IMPORT DUTIES.

Mr. Holland asked the Secretary of State for India whether it was the intention of the Indian Government to give effect to the House of Commons' resolution of July, 1877, relating to import duties, viz., that they ought to be repealed without delay, so soon as the financial condition of India will permit.

Mr. George Russell: The Indian Government, no doubt, regret the necessity for imposing a duty upon imports; but the state of the finances of India is not at present such as to encourage any hope that it can be dispensed with.

March 28th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME IN INDIA. LORD CROMER'S STATEMENT WITHHELD.

Mr. Naoroji asked the Secretary of State for India whether, to ascertain the correctness of Lord Cromer's statement of 1882 about the annual average income per head, and to show whether the people of British India were improving or becoming worse in their material condition, he would grant the return for which a motion stood on this day's paper:

And whether, if he were unwilling to grant as a return the details of Lord Cromer's calculations, as asked in the first part of the motion, he would give an opportunity to the hon. member for Finsbury of personally inspecting them.

Sir E. Grey: Considering that the statement to which my hon. friend refers was confessedly founded upon uncertain data, and that any similar calculation which might now be made must be founded on equally uncertain data and might probably be misleading, the Secretary of State is unable to agree to my hon. friend's motion.

THE POLICY OF TRANS-FRONTIER AGGRESSION. IS THE EXPENDITURE LEGAL?

Sir William Wedderburn asked the Secretary of State for India, whether the consent of both Houses of Parliament, under section 55 of 21 and 22 Vic. c. 106 (An Act for the better Government of India), was obtained for the expenditure on military operations beyond the West and North-West Frontiers of India of the following sums (shown in a Parliamentary Return entitled "East India Military Expenditure beyond the Frontier)," and dated India Office, February, 1895, viz.: Rx. 159,116 in 1884-5; Rx. 2,121,086 in 1885-6; Rx. 116,055 in 1888-9; Rx. 4,825 in 1889-90; Rx. 143,730 in 1890-91:

And, upon what date, with reference to each of the sums mentioned in the previous question was the consent of the House of Commons and of the House of Lords respectively obtained for such expenditure.

Sir E. Grey: The figures given in the Return under the head "Expeditions and Explorations: Expenditure in the Military Department" do not relate to what are called in clause 55 of the Act for the better Government of India, "Military operations carried on beyond the external frontiers" of Her Majesty's Indian possessions for which, as the hon. baronet points out, the consent of Parliament is necessary:—and as a matter of fact there were during the period covered by the Return no "Military operations beyond the external frontiers" on the North-West which were held to fall within the scope of section 55 of the Act.

A reference to the Return which comprises such items as "Railways," "Fortifications," and "Cantonments," shows that it does not refer to expenditure beyond the frontiers of India in the strict sense of the words.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.

Sir William Wedderburn asked the Secretary of State for India, whether his attention had been drawn to an article by the right hon. Sir R. Garth, late Chief Justice of Bengal, in the last number of the *Law Magazine and Review*, as to the value of the Indian National Congress:

And, whether he would state what arrangements the Government of India made to give a hearing to the annual representations of that body.

Sir E. Grey: The Secretary of State has not seen the article to which the hon. member refers, and is, therefore, unable to give any opinion upon its contents.

March 29th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

LEAVE RULES OF THE CIVIL DEPARTMENTS.

Sir Richard Temple asked the Secretary of State for India, whether the Government of India had submitted proposals tending to ameliorate the conditions of service furlough, etc., of European officials of the Indian police and other branches of the Civil (Uncovenanted) Service of India; and, if so, whether any decision had b en come to thereon; and, if not, whether a speedy one might be expected.

Mr. Herbert Gladstone: The Government of India have submitted proposals respecting the leave rules of the various Civil Departments in India. These are now under the consideration of the Secretary of State; but before a final decision can be passed on all points, a further reference to the Government of India will probably be necessary.

FLOGGING IN THE INDIAN ARMY.

On the order for the third reading of the Army (Annual) Bill,

Mr. Hanbury called attention to the distinction drawn between the natives of India and the white men, serving in the Indian Army, in regard to the punishment of flogging, to which the former were liable. These punishments were not only applicable to the natives of India when serving in India, but also even when they came to this country, or served side by side with British troops in Egypt or elsewhere. He was anxious to do away once and for ever with this most invidious distinction. For the law which thus exempted the white man from the punishment of flogging, while it reserved it for the natives, the Government of India were not responsible; it was the deliberate act of the House in passing this Act which they were not allowed to amend.

April 1st.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

EXCISE REVENUE IN THE PUNJAB.

Mr. Samuel Smith asked the Secretary of State for India, whether his attention had been drawn to the large increase in

the amount of excise revenue in the Punjab during the last seven years, amounting to nearly 50 per cent. on the revenue of 1888:

And, whether the Indian Government was taking any steps to prevent the corresponding amount of drunkenness which might be expected to follow this increased consumption of alcohol.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: It is true that the excise revenue in the Punjab has largely increased. The Government of India, by enhancing taxation and by repressing illicit distillation, is doing what it can to discourage excessive consumption, and this policy will be pursued in the future as circumstances may permit.

OFFICERS OF THE GENERAL LIST.

Mr. KIMBER asked the Secretary of State for India, whether his attention had been drawn to the case of the 51 officers who entered the Indian Army in the transition period 1859-61, called Officers of the General List, who entered the Local Service under the option given them by a Government Order in 1861, and who by official declaration down to 1865 were placed on the same footing as the other officers in the Local Service, who had nevertheless been deprived of the privilege of entering the Staff Corps from the Local Service, although other Local Service Officers retained that privilege, were not allowed to take their Majorities and Colonelcies until they had had 20 and 26 years' service respectively, and in 1882, by fresh pension rules, were differentiated from other Local Service Officers, deprived of the right of Colonel's allowances after 12 years' service as Lieutenant Colonel (which right was assured to them by the Royal Warrant of June, 1864), and granted inferior pensions to those of their brother officers in the Local Service:

Whether any explanation had been given for the distinction drawn between the two bodies of officers who had elected for Local Service, although other officers who went at the same time from the General List to the other two branches of service, viz., Staff Corps and General Service, had been treated exactly on the same terms as their brother officers in those respective Services:

Whether this question had been repeatedly brought before the Secretary of State:

What was the present position of the question:

And, was it probable that any satisfaction would be given at an early date to the grievances of these 51 officers.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: The case of the officers of the General List has been considered by successive Secretaries of State, who have never admitted that these officers, who were appointed after the Government of India had been taken over by the Crown, had the same rights as officers of the Local Service appointed prior to that date.

The question was discussed in the House of Commons on the 8th June, 1888, and since then has been considered by Lord Kimberley and by the present Secretary of State who saw no ground for disturbing the previous decisions.

Mr. Fowler is not prepared to re-open the case.

April 2nd.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THE INVASION OF CHITRAL.

Viscount CROSS: I should like to ask whether any further information has been received by the Government from Chitral.

Lord REAY: The only information that has reached us is that Colonel Kelly has reached Gupis.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE COST OF TRANS-FRONTIER AGGRESSION. IS THE EXPENDITURE LEGAL? NO OFFICIAL MAPS!

Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN asked the Secretary of State for India what official maps of India show for each of the years 1858-9, 1874-5, 1884-5) and 1894-5, the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian possessions, for the purposes of section 55 of 21 and 22 Vic., c. 106, the Act for the better Government of India.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: No official maps are in existence to show the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian dominions, with reference to section 55 of the Act for the better government of India.

Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN asked the Secretary of State for India how much of the following sums, namely, Rx. 159,116, Rx. 2,121,086, Rx. 116,055, Rx. 4,825, and Rx. 143,730, shown under the heading of "Expeditions and Explorations, Expenditure in the Military Department," in a Parliamentary Return entitled "East India (Military Expenditure beyond the Frontiers)," and dated India Office, February, 1895, related to military expeditions beyond the West and North-West frontiers of India:

And whether expenditure on military expeditions beyond the West and North-West frontiers of India was included within the words of clause 55 of the Act for the better government of India, namely, "expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian possessions;" and, if not, upon what grounds.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: A Return of the 8th June, 1894, No. 20, "East India (Military Expenditure)," shows the occasions on which the expenditure referred to was incurred, and its amount under each head.

It will be seen from that Return that in 1884-5 the bulk of the expenditure was incurred at Quetta in connection with the demarcation of the Russo-Afghan frontier; and that in the three years 1888-89 to 1890 there was expenditure on the Black Mountain expeditions, and also in the last of those years on an expedition against the tribes on the Miranzai border.

As to the second paragraph of the question, the Secretary of State has nothing to add to the explanation given on the 28th March in answer to a similar question of the hon. baronet's.

Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN asked the Secretary of State for India whether the military operations in Afghanistan, involving during the years 1879-9 to 1882-3 an expenditure of Rx. 18,190,132, as shown in a recent Parliamentary Return, were military operations carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian possessions, within the meaning of section 55 of 21 and 22 Vic., c. 106, an Act for the better government of India:

Whether the consent of Parliament was obtained for the expenditure on these military operations of the following sums: Rx. 600,270 in 1878-9, Rx. 4,642,143 in 1879-80, Rx. 11,297,926 in 1880-1, Rx. 1,631,924 in 1881-2, and Rx. 17,869 in 1882-3 (shown in the Parliamentary Return above referred to):

And upon what date, with reference to each of the sums mentioned in the previous question, was the consent of the House of Commons and of the House of Lords, respectively, obtained for such expenditure.

Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN asked the Secretary of State for India whether and upon what date was the consent of the House of Commons and of the House of Lords respectively obtained for the application of the revenues of India to defray the expenses of military operations in Egypt, being Rx. 1,176,142 in 1882-3, and Rx. 47,874 in 1883-4, as required by clause 55 of the Act for the better government of India:

And whether and upon what date was the consent of the House of Commons and of the House of Lords respectively obtained for the application of the revenues of India to defray the expenses of the annexation of Upper Burma, the military operations connected therewith involving the following expenditure: Rx. 631,000 in 1885-6, Rx. 1,517,800 in 1886-7, and Rx. 1,475,300 in 1887-8.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: The following are the dates of the Resolutions in both Houses of Parliament, under which, in accordance with sec. 55 of the Act for the better government of India, the expenditure mentioned in the hon. baronet's questions was incurred:—Military operations: Afghanistan, Lords, 10th December, 1878; Commons, 17th December, 1878. Egypt, Lords, 25th July, 1882; Commons, 31st July, 1882. Burma, Lords and Commons, 22nd February, 1886.

MILITARY OFFICERS ON LEAVE.

Mr. PIERPOINT asked the Secretary of State for War whether officers of a regiment serving in India who are at home on leave, in case the regiment is detailed for service in the field,

though expected to rejoin without delay, have besides sacrificing their leave to pay their own passages out unless they are recalled by an order of the Adjutant-General in India.

Mr. Campbell-Bannerman: The facts are as stated in the question; but even if recalled by the authorities in India it would be a question for the India Office whether the circumstances would justify an officer's passage being granted at the expense of the Indian Government. It is a well-understood rule that if an officer, whose regiment is abroad, comes home for his own convenience he must rejoin his regiment at his own expense whenever required to do so.

Mr. Pierpoint asked whether the Indian Government ever had, in the circumstances stated by the right hon. gentleman, allowed the expenses of an officer's passage out to India.

Mr. Campbell-Bannerman: I am not aware that they have the power to do it.

April 4th.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THE INVASION OF CHITRAL.

In answer to the Marquess of Lansdowne,

Lord Reay said: I can communicate a telegram just received from the Viceroy, dated 3.15 p.m. to-day, which is as follows:—

"Malak Pass captured yesterday, 3rd April. The pass was very difficult and stoutly held by 3,000, chiefly Mullahs and Sheikhs and their followers, Upper Ranizais, Utman Khels, and Adamzais. Gatherings on Morah and Shahkot Passes had no time to join. Advance was made by our infantry in several columns, and the heights were ultimately carried at the point of the bayonet. Artillery and Maxims co-operated with great success. Enemy lost at least 500, and probably more. Our casualties not yet known fully, but reported as fifty in second brigade alone. First brigade advance to Swat river to-day (4th), and the second follow when pass is fit for camels."

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

EXPENDITURE OF THE INDIAN REVENUES. ROYAL COMMISSION TO BE APPOINTED.

Mr. Samuel Smith asked the Secretary of State for India at what date he proposed to redeem the pledge given by him in this House on the 15th of August last, to the effect that he undertook at the very commencement of this Session to propose the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the financial expenditure of the Indian revenues both in England and in India.

Mr. George Russell: The Secretary of State, in accordance with his statement on the debate on the Address, will advise Her Majesty to appoint a Royal Commission to conduct the inquiry which he promised last Session.

LIEUTENANT QUILTER'S PENSION.

Sir William Wedderburn asked the Secretary of State for India whether honorary Lieutenant Quilter was granted a pension of Rs. 165 per mensem on retirement on 23rd March, 1891, and whether he would have received Rs. 240 per mensem, on succeeding to honorary Captain Ryan, if he had been permitted to count one more month of service for pension.

Whether his claim to the higher pension was strongly supported by the heads of his department and recommended by the Government of India:

Whether Lieutenant Quilter took part in the relief of Lucknow, and was rewarded with "boon" service of not less than one year on that account:

And whether, taking into consideration the fact that Lieutenant Quilter had received no benefit from his "boon" service, he would give effect to the recommendation of the Government of India.

Mr. George Russell: Lieutenant Quilter received the pension to which he was entitled by rank and length of service. It is true that the Government of India recommended an exceptional concession in his favor; but the Secretary of State in Council was unable to accept this suggestion, which appeared to him to be based on a misapprehension of the rules. The present Secretary of State sees no sufficient reason for disturbing his predecessor's decision.

AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME IN INDIA. LORD CROMER'S STATEMENT AGAIN REFUSED.

Mr. Naoroji asked the Secretary of State for India whether as Lord Cromer had stated with regard to his statement of 1882 about the annual average income per head that although he was not prepared to pledge himself to the absolute accuracy of a calculation of this sort, it was sufficiently accurate to justify his conclusion that the taxpaying community was exceedingly poor, and as the calculation was thus accurate, he would grant the return for which a motion stood on this day's Paper, as such return was the only means of forming a fairly correct idea of the material condition of British India:

And, whether if he were unwilling to grant as a return the details of Lord Cromer's calculations, as asked in the first part of the motion, he would give an opportunity to the honourable member for Finsbury of personally inspecting them.

Mr. George Russell: Considering that the statement to which my honourable friend refers was confessedly founded upon uncertain data, and that any similar calculation which might now be made must be founded on equally uncertain data, and might probably be misleading, the Secretary of State is unable to agree to my honourable friend's motion.

REPORT OF THE OPIUM COMMISSION.

Mr. John Ellis asked the Secretary of State for India whether the assurance given on 11th February that the House would be in possession of the report of the Opium Commission before Easter would be realised.

Mr. George Russell: The Secretary of State has no power to give any assurance with regard to the date at which the Royal Commission may send in their report; but, having made inquiries, he has still reason to think that it may be presented by the 11th April.

BANKRUPT OFFICER AT MADRAS.

Mr. Field asked the Secretary of State for War if the circumstances connected with the bankruptcy of an officer in the Madras Staff Corps, and serving at Madras, had been brought under his notice:

And what steps it was intended to take with regard to this officer.

Mr. George Russell: The Secretary of State has no knowledge of the matter to which the hon. member's question refers, except from the documents forwarded to him by the hon. member. He will ask the Government of India to inquire into the matter.

April 6th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE INDIAN CANTONMENTS.

Mr. Henry J. Wilson asked the Secretary of State for India if he would lay upon the Table the Cantonment Acts Amendment Act recently passed by the Government of India, together with any rules adopted in pursuance of the Act, and any resolution of the Government of India relating thereto.

Mr. George Russell: A copy of the Cantonments Act Amendment Act has been received, but the rules framed under the Act and the resolutions of the Government of India relating thereto are not expected to reach this country till about the end of May. The Secretary of State has no objection to laying the papers on the Table of the House.

SIR J. LAMBERT'S BILL.

Mr. Henry J. Wilson asked the Secretary of State for India if he would lay upon the Table a copy of a Bill recently introduced in the Bengal Legislative Council by Sir John Lambert, conferring additional powers on the Calcutta police.

Mr. George Russell: The Secretary of State is not aware that any such Bill has been introduced.

April 8th.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THE INVASION OF CHITRAL.

Lord ASHBOURNE asked if there was any further news from Chitral.

Lord REAY: The following telegram has just been received:—

"From Viceroy, 8th April, 1895.

"Low reports, 7th, strong opposition to bridging operations at Aladand this morning. A large number of enemy crowned heights on the opposite side of river and fired on working parties. Umra Khan's brother was in command with a number of his cavalry and infantry. General Waterfield's Brigade, supported by 15th Bengal Infantry, advanced to force passage of river, No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, and Maxim of King's Own Borderers, co-operating effectively; then 11th Bengal Lancers made brilliant dash across river and attacked enemy, who had begun to bolt up valley. Eleventh pursued for miles, up to Uch, killing about 100. Fourth and 15th Bengal Infantry then forded river and occupied Chakdarra. King's Own Borderers, fording about a mile above, captured Umra Khan's fort at Thana with slight opposition. Our loss was slight—one sapper and few men and horses wounded. Camels are now crossing Malakand Pass; about 1,000 arrived Khar, 7th.

"Low reports 1st Brigade has shifted camp to site 2nd Brigade. Our casualties on 7th crossing Swat river were—2nd Battalion, King's Own Borderers, one man wounded; 11th Bengal Infantry, one man wounded; 4th Sikhs, two men drowned; Sappers, two men wounded. Enemy's loss was 150. Muhammed Shah, Umra Khan's brother, was in command of enemy, and escaped. Three regiments 3rd Brigade on Malakand Pass. Convoy camels came through 7th April. Uch and Katgola Pass will be occupied 8th. Your telegram of 5th. Progress of wounded will be reported by telegraph as soon as known."

April 9th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.

Mr. WALTER M'LAREN asked the Secretary of State for India, with regard to the Bill called the Procedure Bill, which had recently been before the Supreme Legislative Council of India, which proposed among other things to give the courts power to prevent decrees for restitution of conjugal rights being enforced by the imprisonment of the wife, would he explain why the Government abandoned this clause, which was supported by many members and only opposed by three, one of whom was the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal:

Whether the present law that any wife in India, even though she be a child, might be imprisoned for not living with her husband had only been in force for about eighteen years:

And whether the Government would again introduce the proposed reform into the Supreme Legislative Council and endeavour to carry it.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: This clause was unanimously struck out by a Select Committee of seven members, four of whom were natives of India, on the ground that the country was not yet ripe for such a change; and a motion to restore it was lost in the Legislative Council by fifteen votes to two.

Under the present law a wife cannot be imprisoned until the court has heard and considered all objections raised by her; and I am advised that a plea of childhood, if established, would lead to the dismissal of the suit. It is the case that imprisonment in these suits was not prescribed by law until eighteen years ago, but I believe that other methods, not less objectionable, of enforcing conjugal rights were in force before that time.

I have no reason to think that the Government of India propose, in the circumstances which I have stated, to reintroduce the measure at present; but I have no doubt they will do so as soon as they consider that it can be passed with due regard to the state of public opinion in India.

THE PAY OF SURGEON-MAJOR GENERALS.

Mr. HANBURY asked the Secretary of State for India whether it was the fact that the pay of Surgeon-Major Generals in India was reduced, from 1st April last, from Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 2,000 per month; and, if so, whether such reduction would be followed by diminished duties and responsibilities on the part of those officers:

And whether it was proposed to reduce the pay of officers of corresponding rank in India at the same time and on a similar scale.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: The number of the principal medical officers in India has been increased from three to five. The responsibilities of all except the Surgeon-Major General at headquarters have thus been reduced, and their pay is diminished accordingly. It is not proposed to reduce the pay of officers of corresponding rank in India.

THE SPEAKER'S RETIREMENT.

Sir W. HARCOURT moved that the thanks of the House should be given to the Speaker for his distinguished services in the Chair for more than eleven years, and that he should be assured that the House fully appreciated the zeal, ability, and impartiality with which he had discharged the duties of his high office.

Mr. BALFOUR seconded the resolution, and Mr. M'Carthy, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. J. Redmond having supported it,

Mr. NAOROJI said: In the peculiar position in which I am placed here I offer to you, Mr. Speaker, my most sincere and heartfelt gratitude for all the kindness and helpful counsel you have always extended to me. (Cheers.)

The resolution was carried unanimously.

April 22nd.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL.

Sir D. MACFARLANE asked the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether the news of the relief of Chitral had been confirmed.

Sir E. GREY: No, sir; I have not been in communication with the India Office at all.

On the motion for the adjournment of the House,

Mr. ASQUITH said: It may be of interest to the House to know that the Secretary of State for India has received a telegram from the Viceroy to say that the news of the relief of Chitral is confirmed. (Cheers.)

April 23rd.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE EXTENSION OF THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN asked the Secretary of State for India, if he would explain to the House what were the formal steps by which territory lying beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions became legally incorporated within the limits of British India and vested in Her Majesty according to the provisions of section 1 of the Act for the Better Government of India, 1858.

Sir E. GREY: The Secretary of State is not aware that there are any formal steps prescribed by law for the purposes to which the honourable baronet's question refers.

WANTED: OFFICIAL MAPS OF INDIA.

Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN asked the Secretary of State for India, whether, as there are no official maps of British India with reference to section 55 of 21 and 22 Vic. c. 106, he would give a list of all official maps of the whole of British India published for any purpose between the years 1853 and 1895.

Sir E. GREY: If by official maps the hon. baronet means maps published by the Government of India, a list of them (which however does not go further back than 1862) is accessible to the public in the Record Department of the India Office; and the Secretary of State does not think that any useful purpose would be served by giving a return on the subject.

EXTENT OF POPPY CULTIVATION.

Mr. WEBB asked the Secretary of State for India if he would state the number of acres under poppy cultivation in the Behar and Benares Agencies respectively for each of the last four years and for the present year.

Sir E. GREY: The acreage under poppy cultivation in each Agency for the last four years has been:—Behar: 1890-91, 254,975 acres; 1891-92, 234,975 acres; 1892-93, 241,100 acres; 1893-94, 237,341 acres. Benares: 1890-91, 246,742 acres; 1891-92, 226,922 acres; 1892-93, 212,517 acres; 1893-94, 220,881 acres. No report has yet been received of the area actually under poppy cultivation during 1894-95.

THE *TIMES* AND THE OPIUM REPORT.

Mr. HENRY J. WILSON asked the Secretary of State for India whether he could explain how the *Times* had been able to obtain information as to the Report of the Royal Commission on Opium before the Report was presented to Parliament.

Sir E. GREY: The Secretary of State has no information on the subject of my hon. friend's question.

Mr. H. J. WILSON: Will the Secretary of State take some steps to obtain information about it?

Sir E. GREY: I cannot make any promise on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in the matter.

PURCHASE OF MALWA OPIUM.

Mr. SCHWANN asked the Secretary of State for India, whether Sir James Westland, in his Budget Speech at Calcutta, was correctly reported to have stated that the Indian Government had made arrangements for the purchase of crude opium in Malwa.

Sir E. GREY: The official report of Sir James Westland's speech contains the statement cited.

The Secretary of State has no information as to the amount of Malwa opium it is intended to purchase. Such arrangements are within the discretion of the Government of India, and do not require the sanction of the Secretary of State. Similar purchases of Malwa opium for the supply of the Indian demand have been made in previous years when the supply of Bengal opium has been short.

April 25th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES IN INDIA.

Mr. CAINE asked the Secretary of State for India, what steps, if any, had been taken by the various local governments and administrations in India with respect to the recommendations of the Viceroy in Council, under date 17th August, 1889, relating to discipline and moral training in schools and colleges in India:

And, whether he would call for a Return showing in what respects the several suggestions and desires of the Viceroy in Council, contained in the above-mentioned document, especially the desire that each local government and administration should, either by the appointment of a committee, or by employing selected individuals who need not be officials, or by the offer of suitable prizes, effect a revision of readers in the Government schools in a direction indicated had been carried out, and with what results.

Mr. G. RUSSELL: The Secretary of State is not in a position to give a complete reply to the first branch of this question, but he will have no objection to call for a Return showing what has been done in the matter of revising the text-books, or to carry out any of the other suggestions of the Government of India as to which my hon. friend specially desires information.

TAXATION IN BENGAL.

Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGGESSEN asked the Secretary of State for India, whether the Government of Bengal obtained the consent of the Behar Planters' Association to the Bill for the maintenance of the Record of Rights, and for recovering the costs of Cadastral Surveys, imposing on the land of Bengal heavy additional taxation, on the express pledge of the Government that the Patwari Regulation of 1817 should be abolished:

Whether the Secretary of State in a subsequent despatch encouraged the expectation of abolition:

Whether the Government of Bengal, at the last moment, when the Bill came from the Select Committee to be passed into law by the Legislative Council, admitted the promise, but stated that they had amply redeemed it by their endeavours to get the Regulation repealed, but stated that the Government of India had decided against repeal, and that, consequently, they had struck out the repealing clause:

Whether the Mahárájá of Darbhanga, as an elected member of the Council, thereon declared that this would be generally regarded as a breach of faith on the part of the Government:

And, whether the Secretary of State would either veto the Bill or instruct the Government of India to permit the Government of Bengal to fulfil their promise.

Mr. G. RUSSELL: It was stated by the Bengal Government that a part of their scheme was to repeal the Patwari Regulation; but the Secretary of State for India is not aware that an express pledge was given that it should be repealed.

The Secretary of State in July, 1894, assented to the proposal for repeal.

The report of the Bengal Council proceedings of the 9th March, when the Bill was discussed and referred to a Select Committee has not yet reached the Secretary of State: so he is unable to verify the quotations from speeches made at that debate. But so far as he is aware, the Select Committee have not yet reported on the Bill.

The Secretary of State is unable to say what action he will take, until he receives the Act in its final shape and the discussions of the Bengal Council thereon.

THE GOVERNMENT AND CHITRAL.

Mr. WILLIAM REDMOND asked the Secretary of State for India, whether, in view of the fact that the present ruler of Chitral, Amír-ul-Mulk, secured his present position by murdering his brother, it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to support Amir-ul-Mulk as ruler of Chitral.

Mr. G. RUSSELL: As the question of the policy to be pursued in Chitral is under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government the Secretary of State must request the hon. member to postpone his question for the present.

WOMEN IN COAL MINES.

Mr. PROVAND asked the Secretary of State for India, if he had received any Report from the Inspector relating to the employment of women in coal mines in British India; and if not, could he say when the Report might be expected.

Mr. G. RUSSELL: The first Report of the Inspector of Mines in India has been received, and in it the employment of women in Indian Coal Mines is discuussed.

ROYAL COMMISSIONS AND THE PRESS.
THE *TIMES* AND THE OPIUM REPORT.
A SECRETARY'S ERROR.

Mr. CAINE asked the Secretary of State for India, if he was aware that the *Times* newspaper had, during the last six days devoted six columns to an analysis and criticism of the Reports of two Royal Commissions, viz., the Opium and Hemp Drugs Commissions; and that the Hemp Drugs Commission Report was commented upon by the Indian press, with copious quotations, more than two months ago; and, if so, would he cause inquiry to be made how Copies of Reports not yet presented to Parliamant had got into the hands of the press:

And, was he now able to state when these two reports would be issued to Members of this House.

Mr. DODD: I would like to ask the Secretary of State for India whether these two reports were sent to all the principal London papers at the same time or only to the *Times*; and, if only to the *Times*, why that paper alone was selected?

Mr. G. RUSSELL: The Secretary of State has seen the notices to which my hon. friend refers.

The Report of the Hemp Drugs Commission with the orders of the Government of India thereon have been published in India.

The Secretary of State has been informed by the Secretary

to the Opium Commission that owing to an unfortunate misapprehension on his part of the practice in such matters a copy of the Report was prematurely shown by him to a representative of the press. His error has been pointed out to him. (Laughter.)

The Secretary of State will be happy to lay a copy of the Hemp Drugs Commission Report on the Table if my hon. friend will move for it. The Report of the Royal Commission on Opium will be laid upon the Table this evening.

Mr. DODD asked whether the error was confined to one paper only.

Mr. GEORGE RUSSELL: My hon. friend continues to ask me for information which I do not possess. I would tell him if I knew, but I do not. (Laughter.)

THE CASE OF SURGEON-MAJOR SMITH.

Mr. CAINE asked the Secretary of State for India if he was now able to state his decision in the case of Surgeon-Major Smith, lately dismissed by the Government of Madras, who appealed to the Secretary of State against his dismissal on the 18th of January last:

And, if he would lay the Papers relating to this case upon the Table of the House.

Mr. G. RUSSELL: The case of Surgeon-Major Smith is still under the consideration of the Secretary of State.